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ABSTRACT 
Characterizing U.S.-Russian relations as a new Cold War is nostalgic for many, 
but it does not accurately describe Russian motivation behind its current behavior.  
Abraham Maslow, a prominent behavioral psychologist, investigated motivation behind 
human behavior and concluded that human motivation centers on satisfying five basic 
“needs.” It is plausible to modify his hierarchy of basic human needs and develop a 
similar hierarchy of basic state needs.  A single case study examining Soviet regression 
from a strong state identity and the Russian Federation’s attempts to reestablish it 
demonstrates the utility of the hierarchy.  Understanding where a state falls in its pursuit 
of a strong state identity gives intelligence analysts providing assessments to U.S. policy 
makers a framework to assess, categorize, and predict general trends in state behavior.  
Consequently, it becomes more accurate to describe current Russian behavior as attempts 
to satisfy its prepotent needs for external security while also attempting to satisfy to a 
lesser extent its needs for prestige and domestic security.  This comprehensive 
explanation of motivation behind Russian behavior allows U.S. policy makers to craft 
policy which either helps or impedes Russia in its pursuit of a strong state identity.  
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I. A HIERARCHY OF NEEDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
News headlines are replete with examples of continuing friction between the 
United States and Russia.  Many in the news media cite Russia’s renewed interest in 
Latin America and a return of Russian bomber patrols near North America as proof of a 
second Cold War.  Characterizing U.S.-Russian relations as a new Cold War is nostalgic 
for many, but it does not accurately describe Russian motivation behind these behaviors.  
What then is Russia’s motivation for their interest in Latin American or flying bomber 
missions near North America?  A more appropriate question to ask is what motivates 
states in general to undertake specific behaviors?  This thesis proposes that states in the 
international system have five basic and universal needs that drive all of their behaviors.   
The project uses the Soviet Union and Russia as its primary successor state as a 
case study to explore the relationship between states’ needs and their behaviors.  First, the 
project will evaluate Soviet development beginning with the period just after its victory 
in World War II.  It examines changes in state needs and subsequent behaviors as the 
Soviet Union gradually declined in state power until its dissolution in December 1991.  
Secondly, it evaluates Russian Federation needs and resulting behaviors as it consolidated 
a state identity in the years during Vladimir Putin’s first administration.   
The concept of categorizing behaviors according to needs is not new.  In fact, it 
was psychologist Abraham Maslow who first introduced the notion that basic needs 
motivate human behavior.  Maslow’s theory on human motivation and his subsequent 
hierarchy form the intellectual foundation for the remainder of this thesis.     
B. PURPOSE 
Abraham Maslow observed changes in individual human behavior according to a 
hierarchy of needs.  He postulated that individuals change behavior once satisfying first 
tier “physiological” needs of sustenance (e.g., air, food, water) and soon adopt behaviors 
to satisfy second tier “safety” needs, such as shelter and protection.  Mentally healthy 
people progress through the five different levels of needs satisfying lower level (more 
basic needs) before progressing to higher level needs in the hierarchy (Figure 1).1  They 
subconsciously adopt behaviors in an effort to satisfy each level of needs ultimately 
seeking to achieve the highest level Maslow called “self actualization.”2  Subsequently, 
Maslow concludes the existence of a causal relationship between human needs and 
behavior.   
 
Figure 1.   Maslow’s Hierarchy 
Maslow’s hierarchy ultimately seeks to define a developmental path to what he 
called full humanness, or a person with a “high level of maturation,” less dependent on 
others, and with a consolidated self-identity.3  In short, it seeks to define the 
characteristics of strong individuals.  Assuming the validity of Maslow’s work in the 
behavioral sciences, this project modifies Maslow’s hierarchy to define the characteristics 
of strong states.  It uses a modified hierarchy for investigating the relationship between 
                                                 
1 Maslow advances a linear model while acknowledging the likelihood of simultaneously needs 
satisfaction. 
2 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 
1982), 152-60. 
3 Ibid., 34, 71. 
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states’ needs and their behaviors.  Using this concept, observers would expect different 
behaviors from a subject progressing through the hierarchy toward strong state identity 
than they would expect from a subject regressing or remaining static in the hierarchy.  
Monitoring such changes in state behavior from the ebb and flow of its needs forms the 
foundation of work done by professional intelligence analysts. 
C. IMPORTANCE  
Exploring how needs drive state behavior is of critical interest to intelligence 
professionals.  Intelligence analysts attempt to predict threats to U.S. national security 
and advise policy makers on the appropriate use of national resources to mitigate these 
threats.  It is not sufficient to assess what a state of interest is doing in the present.  
Intelligence professionals must attempt to anticipate a state’s behavior in the future.  
Intelligence professionals analyze a state of interest’s current and past behaviors 
to identify trends between them.  After identifying these trends, the analyst must extend 
these same trends into the future in an attempt to predict a range of behaviors a state will 
take at a specific time in the future.  Analysts will present this range of expected state 
behaviors to policy makers based on the state’s short term goals (measured in days or 
weeks) and/or its long term goals (measured in months and years).  The range usually 
begins with the most likely behaviors expected to the less likely or remote.  Presentation 
of a range of predicted state behaviors allows policy makers to allocate resources 
efficiently to counter expected adversarial behaviors.  A hierarchy of needs could provide 
a theoretical model and framework for formulating intelligence assessments and 
anticipating what a state’s likely behaviors will be at some point in the future.  A further 
review of Maslow’s theories provides insight into this hypothesis. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
Maslow proposed a correlation between human capacities, needs, and behavior.  
In his exploration of these relationships, Maslow defines needs as the capacity or 
capability to do something.  As an example, he explains that human beings with muscles 
must use these muscles or, in other words, they have a need to use their muscles.  
 4
                                                
Humans with eyes have a need to use their eyes and so on.4  Some needs are common to 
all humankind (e.g., physiological needs of sustenance) while others are specific to 
individuals and change from person to person where “…idiosyncratic needs generate 
idiosyncratic values.”5  Maslow continues this thought by stating, “He [the subject of 
observation] does not know in advance that he will strive on after this gratification has 
come, and that gratification of one basic need opens consciousness to domination by 
another, higher need.”6  The striving that Maslow describes manifests itself as behaviors 
that individuals adopt to satisfy needs. 
Consequently, Maslow and other psychologists observe human behavior to assess 
an individual’s development and progress through the hierarchy of needs.  They seek to 
diagnose a causal relationship between unsatisfied needs and behaviors exhibited by the 
subject.  Psychologists make these observations in an attempt to diagnose and ultimately 
correct “unhealthy” causal mechanisms; likewise, intelligence analysts observe state 
behavior and attempt to determine the state’s motivation for it.  Though Maslow was 
interested in a subject’s unhealthy behaviors, intelligence analysts are more interested in 
a state’s threatening behaviors.  Consequently, Maslow provides a useful tool for 
observers of international relations in the evaluation of states’ behaviors; however, this 
method is somewhat different from traditional views of state motivation.   
E. TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF STATE MOTIVATION   
Though political scientists and observers of international relations may concede 
some of the assumptions of this argument, others, concerned with the validity of this 
proposal, will likely reject the overall approach of using a hierarchy of needs applied to 
states.  In fact, contradictory reasons will likely underscore rejection of this approach 
since political scientists often disagree over the objective reality of the international 
system itself. 
 
4 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 152. 
5 Ibid., 151-2. 
6 Ibid., 152-3. 
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Realists will likely concede one of this proposal’s premises, but will likely 
dismiss the argument as a whole as invalid.  First, Realists (e.g., Morgenthau, Carr, and 
Waltz) agree that states are the primary actor in the international system.7  They 
acknowledge participation of other non-state actors in the international system, but they 
argue that relations among states are what constitute the international system.  While 
Liberalists, such as Keohane, do not disagree that states are the primary actor, they do 
assert that non-state actors are important to the international system and play a critical 
role in the relations among states.8  In fact, Doyle proposes that non-state actors, such as 
international institutions and regimes, function to provide a forum for states to pursue 
common interests and negotiate their differences to avoid conflict.9  Besides debating 
actors in the international system, political scientists disagree on what motivates states’ 
behaviors. 
Realists will likely appreciate the pursuit of power and security as the basis for the 
first two tiers of the hierarchy.  At the heart of Waltz’s Structural or Neo-Realism is the 
anarchic nature of the international system.10  This anarchic system without an 
overarching authority above states creates a “self-help” situation where states accrue 
power at the expense of others in order to ensure their own security.  In this zero sum 
game environment, “the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must.”11 
Liberalists disagree with Realists as to what motivates states’ behaviors and will 
likely agree with the premise of the fourth tier of the hierarchy where prestige needs drive 
states’ behaviors.  Liberalists do acknowledge the importance security plays in states’ 
foreign policy pursuits; however, they argue cooperation towards mutual benefit can 
 
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton, Politics among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006), 8. 
8 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5-9. 
9 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 
no. 3 (Summer 1983), 232-34, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-
3915%28198322%2912%3A3%3C205%3AKLLAFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O (accessed March 2008). 
10 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State, and War; A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), 159-61. 
11 Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War 
and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts, Updated 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), 57. 
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motivate states’ behaviors as well.  In fact, Robert Axelrod demonstrated this opportunity 
for cooperation in an anarchic system of self-help using the Prisoner’s Dilemma.12  
Additionally, Norman Angell proposed that economic interdependence minimizes the 
importance of political and military power making great conflicts less likely in the 
modern era.13  The differences between these schools of thought reside in the differences 
of their basic worldviews. 
Realists see their approach as an empirical, descriptive method to study 
international relations where certain fundamental laws exist that determine the nature of 
the international system.  Realists argue that these laws provide a certain level of 
predictability in the system.  States can always assume that other states will act in their 
own best interests according to the self-help environment of the anarchic international 
system.  Conversely, in 1909, Angell proposed that human nature is in a process of 
change and becomes less aggressive over time.14  In this regard, he advocates a 
normative approach to international relations, which is inherent in Liberalism.  They 
acknowledge the anarchic, self-help system of national interests; but as stated above, they 
argue it is often in the national interests of states to cooperate with each other toward 
mutual benefit. 
Critics are sure to question the proposed link in human behavior to the behavior of 
states.  Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, theorists of political science’s Constructivist 
school of thought, offer insight to this criticism.  They propose states have an inherent 
identity where they “…often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what 
they are representing, who they are, which in turn depends on their social 
relationships.”15  They also contend that “…changes in state identity affect the national 
 
12 Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (London; New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 
190-1. 
13 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion; a Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their 
Economic and Social Advantage (New York: Garland Pub., 1972), 27-43, 215-22. 
14 Ibid., 222. 
15 Ron Jepperson, Alex Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. 
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 60. 
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security interests and policies of states.”16  This Constructivist concept of a state’s 
identity provides a natural bridge from the behavioral sciences into political science for 
applying a hierarchy of needs to states.  It is the foundation of explaining how a hierarchy 
of needs is an appropriate model of analyzing the behavior of states within the 
international system and yet differs greatly with the other schools of thought. 
Constructivism focuses less on constitutive features and instead centers on the 
intersubjective meanings shared in the international system.  Constructivism rejects 
Realism’s notion that self-help is a constitutive feature of the international system.  As an 
example, Realists contend that a twenty-five percent increase in State A’s defense budget 
poses a threat to State B who will consequently raise its budget.  Constructivists argue 
that it makes a difference in the intersubjective meanings of that increase.17  In other 
words, a twenty-five percent raise in China’s defense spending has a much different 
meaning than a similar raise in Iceland’s (a state without a military) defense spending.  
China’s increase could spark an arms race with the United States or Japan where an 
increase in Iceland’s defense spending is likely to go unnoticed by the international 
community.  Referring back to needs, these intersubjective meanings states place on the 
dynamics in the international system can contribute to the development (progression vs. 
regression) of a state through the hierarchy.  As a result, a state’s progress within the 
hierarchy has concrete policy implications, yet, there is potential for error in this project.  
F. AVOIDANCE OF LOGICAL FALLACIES   
Several errors could undermine the results of this project.  First, Edwin Nevis 
criticizes Maslow for cultural bias and argues for the re-ordering of the hierarchy when 
applying it to other cultures.  As an example, Nevis contends belonging needs in Chinese 
culture are much more important than safety or even physiological needs.  He explains 
“the most basic assumption is that being a good member of society and putting group 
 
16  Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 60. 
17 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), 411, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
8183%28199221%2946%3A2%3C391%3AAIWSMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9. 
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goals before individual needs should govern all practices” in Chinese culture.18  
Consequently, Nevis criticizes Maslow for constructing his hierarchy from an American 
point of view emphasizing individualism as a universal goal for all human beings.19  This 
observation underscores the importance of minimizing the influence of biases and 
constructing a hierarchy with the ambitious goal of universality.  While cultural bias is a 
criticism levied at Maslow, scholars list other shortfalls as well.     
One of the principal criticisms leveled at Maslow concerns his proposition of 
classifying human needs according to a hierarchy.  Much of the critical literature on 
Maslow argues that humans pursue needs simultaneously and not in linear fashion.  
Several other psychological theories attempt to address this perceived shortcoming and 
propose alternative theories for human motivation (e.g., Adlefer’s ERG theory and 
McClelland’s Acquired Needs theory).20    
Ultimately, Maslow was aware of some of these criticisms during his own time 
and welcomed scrutiny of his findings from the scholarly community.  In 1943, Maslow 
attempted to correct some of the misrepresentations of his theories.  He acknowledged 
that human beings do pursue needs simultaneously and are capable of being only partially 
satisfied in multiple needs at the same time.  Dennis O’Connor and Leodones Yballe 
argue that Maslow proposed needs in a hierarchical form to offer a simplistic model to 
describe ordinary life knowing that what takes place in reality is much more 
complicated.21  This thesis continues forward in a similar vein of offering a simplistic 
model representing the highly complex nature of international relations.       
 
18 Edwin C. Nevis, “Using an American Perspective in Understanding another Culture: Toward a 
Hierarchy of Needs for the People's Republic of China,” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 19, no. 
3 (January 1, 1983): 249-64, 
http://ft.csa.com/ids70/resolver.php?sessid=479tmmdda962jhcb06apbgp1k1&server=www-
ca2.csa.com&check=b98276709f109ef59ee4a045acfcf70f&db=sageman-set-c&key=0021-
8863%2F10.1177_002188638301900304&mode=pdf (accessed February 26, 2008), 253. 
19 Ibid., 254. 
20 Sylvia Kierkegaard and Patrick Kierkegaard, What Women (Men) Want!: E-Consumer's Need and 
Right of Information, Aalborg University, 4, http://medforist.grenoble-
em.com/Contenus/Conference%20Tunisia%20IEBC%202005/papers/June25/50.pdf (accessed November 
14, 2008).  
21 Dennis O'Connor and Leodones Yballe, “Maslow Revisited: Constructing a Road Map of Human 
Nature,” Journal of Management Education 31, no. 6 (December 1, 2007): 740, 
http://jme.sagepub.com/cgi/content/short/31/6/738 (accessed November 14, 2008). 
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The project also recognizes the potential for severe logical fallacies applying a 
theory prominent in the analysis of individual behavior to the analysis of state behavior.  
Ecological fallacy or correlations made from the analysis of group data spuriously 
applied to individual behavior could potentially impact the conclusions of this study.22  In 
a landmark study in 1950, W. S. Robinson cautioned that different levels of analysis 
potentially yield different results in statistical studies.23  Specifically, he identified errors 
made in the study of nativity and its impact on literacy rates.  He leveled criticism at the 
study’s focus on the aggregate or ecological level of analysis attributing higher literacy 
rates to foreign born residents of U.S. states.  In actuality, analysis at the individual level 
correctly attributed lower literacy rates to foreign born state residents.  A propensity of 
the foreign born residents to settle in areas of high native literacy accounted for the 
erroneous results of analysis conducted at the ecological level.  Robinson, therefore, 
cautioned against making inferences on individual behavior from conclusions drawn from 
aggregates.24   
Similarly, this thesis attempts to minimize hasty generalizations or what Adam 
Przeworski and Henry Teune called individualistic fallacy or “the error of incorrectly 
imputing to the higher order unit the aggregation of values of individuals.”25  Simply put, 
conclusions made regarding individual behavior cannot necessarily apply directly to 
group behavior.  For example, Mitchell Seligson criticizes Ronald Inglehart for linking 
“micro-level attitudes” of political culture to the “macro-level attitudes of regime type.”26  
Essentially, Seligson’s argument was that Inglehart’s study mixed levels of analysis 
 
22 Sharon Schwartz, “The Fallacy of the Ecological Fallacy: The Potential Misuse of a Concept and 
the Consequences,” American Journal of Public Health 84, no. 5 (May 1, 1994): 819, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1514235&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&V
Type=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1217290303&clientId=11969 (accessed May 28, 2008), p. 
819. 
23 W. S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,” American Sociological 
Review 15, no. 3 (June 1950): 351-357, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2087176 (accessed October 23, 2008). 
24 David A. Freedman, Ecological Inference and the Ecological Fallacy (Berkeley, CA: Prepared for 
the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, (October 15, 1999), 
http://www.stanford.edu/class/ed260/freedman549.pdf (accessed October 23, 2008).  
25 Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological 
Fallacy?” Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (April 2002): 273, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4146954 (accessed 
October 23, 2008).  
26 Ibid., 273-275. 
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creating spurious relationships between its variables and yielding inaccurate results.27  As 
this thesis seeks to apply techniques of individual human analysis to states, this logical 
fallacy is potentially the most destructive to any conclusions reached; consequently, 
adjustments made to the modified hierarchy of states’ needs attempt to minimize these 
effects.  As a result, this thesis will attempt to minimize these logical fallacies and focus 
on the state as the appropriate level of analysis as its guiding analytical method.   
G. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY 
Though Maslow’s research investigated the needs of individuals, this project 
investigates the needs of states and not the needs of individuals comprising the state.  In 
this regard, the project adopts Realist and Liberal assumptions of states as the primary 
actors in the international system.  Additionally, some political theory investigates how 
individual actions of ruling elites constitute national policy; this project does not apply 
the hierarchy to ascertaining the needs of individual people.  The project assumes the 
primacy of the state and attributes foreign policy to a single entity called the state in an 
attempt to minimize the potential for individualistic fallacy.  With these assumptions in 
mind, the thesis’s argument and support will proceed in the following manner.   
Chapter I introduces the thesis and outlines the link between Maslow’s research 
and the application of his thoughts to the political sciences.  It provides a brief summary 
of the thesis’s intent and outlines its methodology.  Following this introduction, the 
second chapter explains the application of the hierarchy to states explaining each level of 
the modified hierarchy in detail.  Application of the hierarchy to a case study constitutes 
the third chapter.   
The Soviet Union and Russia as its primary successor state constitute the only 
case study and is the focus of the third chapter.  The project analyzes two specific periods 
of Soviet/Russian history outlined above to demonstrate the application of the modified 
hierarchy of needs applied to states.  It examines the Soviet Union’s descent through the  
 
 
27 Seligson, “The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy?” 287. 
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hierarchy and the impact of this descent on Soviet/Russian foreign policy.  It continues 
by assessing Russia’s ascent up the hierarchy and how these changes affected Russia’s 
foreign policy decisions.   
Chapter IV concludes the study.  It summarizes the findings of the project and 
proposes minor modifications before using it in an operational environment.  It assesses 
Russia’s current status within the hierarchy and forecasts general trends expected in 
Russian behavior during 2009.  In light of these expected behaviors, the study finishes 
with recommendations for U.S. policy concerning Russia.   
In the final analysis, this proposal holds great potential for explaining state 
motivation.  Traditional political theory forms its foundation; however, its intent is to 
provide an operational tool for the U.S. intelligence community.  The following chapter 
will discuss these assertions in greater depth and explains the hierarchy in detail.    
 12
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II. HIERARCHY IN DETAIL  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Political science is replete with theories and models attempting to address why 
states conduct themselves in the manner they do.  This thesis seeks to provide an 
operational method for observers to categorize states’ actions into five general categories 
loosely based on Maslow’s original hierarchy.  Whereas progression up Maslow’s 
hierarchy describes an individual with a strong self-identity, progression up the modified 
hierarchy of states’ needs describes and ultimately defines characteristics of strong states.  
In short, strong states maintain internal legitimacy by mitigating internal challenges to its 
authority.  Strong states also subdue outside aggression that threatens their population 
and challenges their external legitimacy.  Finally, strong states enjoy prestige and 
influence with other states in the international system.  Conversely, Maslow describes 
regression as “stunting” and “human diminution” of the individual.28  Likewise, 
regression in the modified hierarchy of states’ needs signifies deterioration of the state 
into a weakened polity.   
Though this thesis ultimately seeks to shed light on the relationship between a 
state’s needs and its behavior, its intent is to provide an operational framework (vice a 
scholarly model) for the analysis of state intentions.29  This operational framework 
enables intelligence analysts and policy makers to understand and communicate quickly 
general intentions (i.e., needs) of a state of interest.  While this thesis asserts the 
hierarchy’s use in conveying general information quickly, it will not propose a specific 
process for its implementation in the intelligence community.  Such an endeavor could 
come as subsequent work to this thesis.      
 
28 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, vii. 
29. While Maslow is the original inspiration for applying a hierarchy of needs to state behavior, this 
project takes great care not to overlay all of his concepts of human behaviors onto states. The impact of 
spurious data from ecological and individualistic fallacies continues to be at the forefront of this project. 
Additionally, this thesis assumes the following formula as a foundation of the U.S. intelligence community: 
threat to U.S. interests = capability to do harm + intention to do so. 
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Combatant Commanders and other decision makers do not often have the time to 
evaluate byzantine arguments of why states act the way they do during an on-going crisis.  
They seek to understand quickly what a state’s intentions are and to possibly intercede 
before those intentions are realized leaving any academic post analysis for peacetime.  Is 
it necessary for intelligence officials and policy makers to discuss the dependent and 
independent variables possibly explaining why Russia invaded Georgia on August 8, 
2008?  Or is it sufficient for intelligence officials to explain the Russian invasion of 
Georgia as part of a comprehensive strategy to regain great power status and block 
further NATO eastward expansion as attempts to satisfy its third and fourth tier needs 
according to the modified hierarchy of states’ needs?   
This statement conveys quite a bit of meaning and presents a range of policy 
options for decision makers.  Just as Maslow attempted to diagnose maladies in 
individual behavior and treat them with the appropriate medical technique, intelligence 
professionals and policy makers can apply various techniques to developing political 
trauma in international relations.  For example, U.S. decision makers can adopt policies 
that seek to counter specific state actions, or they can construct policies that seek to help 
the state of interest satisfy its overarching need driving its behavior in a more 
constructive manner.  Another example may better demonstrate this concept. 
China, at first glance, appears ascending up the hierarchy of needs and seems to 
be transitioning from fourth tier prestige needs to the fifth tier and a strong state identity.  
Consequently, hosting the 2008 Olympic Games was a critical event towards satisfaction 
of Chinese fourth tier needs during this important transition.  The U.S. government has 
recognized the importance of the games to Chinese prestige and what it meant for 
China’s rise as an international great power.  They have attempted to help China make 
this transition peacefully as a partner and avoid conflict that sometimes accompanies 
these transitions.30  Senator Hillary Clinton and others in the U.S. advised President 
 
30 Gilpin’s Hegemonic War Theory outlines conflict sometimes associated with the rise of great 
powers new to the state of the international system. Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988), 
591-613, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C591%3ATTOHW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3 (accessed January 12, 2008). 
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George W. Bush to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games in 
protest of Chinese repression of freedoms in Tibet and other provinces.  Rather than react 
to this specific Chinese behavior and possibly cause antipathy between the two nations, 
the U.S. president chose to attend the opening ceremonies.  President Bush was able to 
enhance Chinese prestige needs while at the same time press Chinese officials to adopt 
policies of restraint when dealing with political dissent.  Conversely, the U.S. has not 
shown the same insight and flexibility to Russian needs of security and prestige 
concerning U.S. policy on creating a National Missile Defense (NMD) shield.   
Before explaining the modified hierarchy, it is first necessary to summarize 
Maslow’s original hierarchy.  Maslow proposed a five-tiered structure to explain 
“normal” human progression from one level of needs to the next.  He defines normal as a 
“psychopathology of the average, so undramatic and so widely spread that we don't even 
notice it ordinarily.”31  Ultimately, his hierarchy seeks to define an individual with a 
strong sense of self-identity (Figure 1).   
The hierarchy begins with first tier “physiological” needs where needs for basic 
human sustenance of air, water, and food drive all behaviors until satisfaction.  The 
second tier is “safety” needs where priorities lie in the security of body, family, property, 
employment, and the like.  “Belonging” needs dominate the third tier characterized by a 
desire for intimate and close relationships with other humans.  Satisfaction of third tier 
needs leads to the quest for satisfying fourth tier “esteem” needs.  Respect, respect for 
others and respect by others, characterizes these esteem needs.  The fifth and final tier is 
“self-actualization,” which Maslow describes as the ability to be fully human or 
autonomous.32  As previously discussed in Chapter I, Maslow acknowledges the human 
desire to service multiple needs simultaneously; however, he still contends that lower 
level needs are prepotent to needs higher in the hierarchy.  Maslow summarizes his 
thoughts by explaining:  
 
 
31 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 16. 
32 Ibid., 39. 
…these needs or values are related to each other in a hierarchical and 
developmental way, in an order of strength and of priority.  Safety is a 
more prepotent, or stronger, more pressing, more vital need than love, for 
instance, and the need for food is usually stronger than either.33 
Likewise, this thesis proposes states as complex entities can satisfy needs 
simultaneously; however, it will present them in a hierarchical construct to offer a 
simplistic model for what drives state behavior.  Towards this end, legitimacy needs 
represent the most basic needs and foundation of the modified hierarchy.  Upon satisfying 
legitimacy needs, states seek to satisfy internal security needs.  The third tier of the 
modified hierarchy represents external security needs, and the fourth tier is prestige 
needs.  After satisfying each level, states achieve the fifth tier known as Strong State 
Identity (Figure 2).       
 
Figure 2.   Modified Hierarchy of States’ Needs 
This method represents an ex post facto analysis of state behavior to determine 
what tier on the hierarchy a state’s behavior represents.  To use a metaphor, it attempts to 
draw a regression line, in a sense, through the raw data of a scatter plot of state behavior.  
To continue the metaphor, the state’s observable actions, policy statements by its ruling 
                                                 
33 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 153. 
 16
 17
                                                
elites, published military doctrine, public opinion, and other possible inputs represent the 
data of the scatter plot.  After conducting analysis on these inputs, it is possible to 
determine which level of the hierarchy the inputs reflect.   
This determination allows a focused analysis and continued observation to 
ascertain the state’s current status within the hierarchy.  Again, analysts expect different 
behaviors from states remaining static in the hierarchy than they would expect from states 
progressing or regressing within it.  Concluding an assessment of a state’s needs and its 
current status in the hierarchy, it is possible to extend the line of logic into the future to 
forecast general behaviors the state could take to satisfy its needs.  Intelligence 
professionals then present these expected behaviors that states undertake to satisfy their 
needs to policy makers for action.  Readers of this thesis might ask what makes this 
approach different from current intelligence practices. 
Using the modified hierarchy of states’ needs attempts to minimize a tendency of 
intelligence personnel to “mirror image,” or evaluate information through an analyst’s 
filter of personal experience.34  Analysts will often evaluate intelligence unaware they are 
viewing it through this filter and disregard critical information because it is “illogical” 
from their perspective.  Another example of this same bias is analysts who think to 
themselves “this would be my next move if I were in their shoes.”  An analyst’s inability 
to minimize this natural tendency distorts the assessment and can have devastating effects 
on developing a range of expected state behaviors, known as courses of action (COAs), 
and disseminating those COAs to U.S. decision makers.35  Douglas Porch and James 
Wirtz attribute mirror imaging as a factor for the intelligence failures associated with the 
successful 9/11 and Pearl Harbor attacks against the United States.36   
 
34 Lauren Witlin, “Of Note: Mirror-Imaging and its Dangers,” SAIS Review XXVIII, no. 1 (Winter-
Spring 2008): 89-90, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v028/28.1witlin.pdf (accessed October 20, 
2008). 
35 Mareen Dowd, “The Mirror has Two Faces: [Op Ed],” New York Times, February 1, 2004, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=535578201&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD
&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226707142&clientId=11969 (accessed October 20, 
2008). 
36 Douglas Porch and James J. Wirtz, “Surprise and Intelligence Failure,” Strategic Insights 7, no. 1 
(September 2002), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/homeland.pdf (accessed October 20, 2008). 
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Additionally, misperceptions of state intent can have devastating impact on 
analytical assessments and subsequent policies decisions.  Jack Levy, expanding on 
Robert Jervis’ Misperception Theory, outlines how inaccurate assessments of intent, over 
or under estimation of an adversary’s capability, and misjudging the intent of third parties 
can lead to war.37 
U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War after the Tonkin Gulf incident provides an 
example of how perspective impacts U.S. foreign policy.  Many U.S. analysts during the 
1960s saw conflict in Vietnam in terms of the Domino Theory and as an extension of an 
international Socialist revolution; however, many historians now criticize this view as 
myopic and see the Vietnam War from a Vietnamese perspective where the war was 
merely one part of centuries old quest for national liberation against numerous invaders.  
Understanding a state’s actions from its perspective is critical for formulating successful 
U.S. policy.  Applying the wrong policy to an international development can be like 
putting a square peg into a round hole.  Analysts must remain cognizant of the differences 
in perspective from an office cubicle in the suburbs of Washington, D.C. and how the 
same developments look from the capital of the country where they are happening; 
therefore, the modified hierarchy of states’ needs attempts to keep the focus of analysis 
on the needs of the state from the state’s perspective and not from the analyst’s 
perspective.  
Additionally, this thesis intends the hierarchy to function as a tool to bridge the 
periodic disconnect between strategic, operational, and tactical analyses.  The tiers of the 
modified hierarchy are broad macro levels of analysis explaining why states undertake 
specific behaviors.  Consequently, most states break their broad goals down into 
operational and tactical objectives that together accomplish the broad strategic goal.  
However, some intelligence analysts get tunnel vision when evaluating a single 
operational or tactical level event.  They focus on the single event rather than explaining 
its contribution to the state’s broad strategic goal.   
 
37 Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkage and Analytical 
Problems,” World Politics 36, no. 1 (October 1993): 76-99, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-
8871%28198310%2936%3A1%3C76%3AMATCOW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A (accessed October 20, 2008). 
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On the surface, this thesis might appear to only assume rationality of state actions 
with the assertion that states break goals down into smaller constituent parts.  However, it 
does acknowledge the relevance of Graham Allison’s second and third “conceptual 
lenses” where “organizational processes” and “bureaucratic politics” sometimes work 
towards contradictory goals and undermine the notion of a unitary, rational actor.38  
Graham’s example of the U.S. military service chiefs working against President 
Kennedy’s goals during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates the irrationality that can 
develop during international crises.39   
Individual actors or different strata of the bureaucracy could potentially seek to 
satisfy goals at different levels of the hierarchy.  For example, the military might display 
actions typical of third tier external security needs while the ruling elite seek to satisfy 
second tier internal security needs.  While intelligence analysts should strive to 
understand these nuances in state behavior, such endeavors quickly begin to complicate 
the model this thesis offers and confuse its level of analysis.  Therefore, the modified 
hierarchy of states’ needs operates from a framework assuming a unitary rational actor; 
yet it concedes that state behavior is the result of complex interactions from multiple sub-
entities.  Consequently, states as unitary, rational actors have several tasks they must 
accomplish.        
States have several primary responsibilities.  According to Robert Rotberg, states 
must respond to the demands of their populations while at the same time directing the 
energies of their people towards common goals.  This in no way implies states must cater 
to every whim of their population.  Rather, states must respond to a minimum set of 
demands from their population to mitigate any internal challenge to the state’s authority.  
Additionally, states engage with outside or foreign entities to represent the interests of 
 
38 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political 
Science Review 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 689-90, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28196909%2963%3A3%3C689%3ACMATCM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 (accessed November 17, 
2008). 
39 Ibid., 707. 
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their constituent population.  Simply put, states provide public goods for their citizens.40  
Public goods delivered by the state create a predictable environment for its population 
and foster “growth of economic opportunity” for its citizens.41   
Strong states are more efficient at providing public goods.  They provide a variety 
of high quality public goods desired by its population, such as transportation 
infrastructure, education, and medical care.  At the same time, they provide security for 
its population against internal and external threats.  Weak states may provide some or all 
of these public goods to varying degrees.  Yet, they are less efficient than their strong 
state peers.42  Despite this model’s potential for quickly communicating information on 
how a state accomplishes these primary responsibilities, it does have its limitations.  
Like all models, the modified hierarchy attempts to simplify complex interactions 
and processes and does not entirely eliminate the potential for error.  For example, the 
hierarchy attempts to minimize the tendency to mirror image, yet it cannot completely 
eliminate it.  Analysts must constantly ask themselves, “What are the needs of the state 
from its perspective?”  Failure to do so could result in an incorrect placement of a state 
within the hierarchy, which potentially distorts all subsequent analyses.   
Additionally, the hierarchy only assigns five general possibilities explaining why 
states exhibit the behaviors they do.  Are there unique needs of states that do not fit neatly 
into the hierarchy as it is currently structured?  To explore some of these questions in 
greater detail, this thesis will begin to clarify each level of the modified hierarchy 
beginning with legitimacy needs.  
B.  TIER ONE: LEGITIMACY NEEDS 
Maslow’s first tier, and the foundation of his hierarchy, attributes physiological 
needs of air, food, and water as absolute necessities to sustain human life.  A person’s 
 
40 Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and 
Repair,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 2. 
41 Ibid., 4. 
42 Ibid. 
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failure to satisfy these needs results in “their deprivation [which] makes the person sicken 
and wither.”43  The likely outcome from deprivation of these needs is the termination of 
the individual’s life.  Likewise, states have basic needs necessary to sustain them as well.   
A state’s most basic need is for legitimacy.  Legitimacy can represent a state’s 
birth in a sense when endorsed by the international community, and it can provide the 
source of state power when supported by its citizens.  Without either of these, the state 
very likely withers away and ceases to exist.  Yet, legitimacy is a complex and difficult 
concept to define in absolute terms.  It has both an internal and external component 
equally critical to sustaining the state.   
First, states have an endogenic requirement for legitimacy.  This internal aspect of 
legitimacy concerns the will of the governed.  Wolfgang Mommsen, summarizing Max 
Weber, defines legitimacy as “…the empirically discernible willingness [of the ruled] to 
subject themselves to a particular system of domination and to accept its norms as 
personally binding.”44  To Weber, the population’s happiness with the ruling elite is 
irrelevant to the legitimacy of the state.  Their submission to the authority of the state out 
of fear, self interest, or other reason is all that is necessary to maintain the state’s 
legitimacy.  In other words, the state ceases to be legitimate when the people decide it no 
longer is and no longer abide by the established norms of the state.45  The collapse of the 
German Democratic Republic (i.e., GDR) provides an example of this endogenic nature 
of legitimacy. 
The population of the GDR demonstrates Weber’s internal sense of legitimacy.  
For decades, the GDR maintained its legitimacy with the acquiescence of its people to the 
established totalitarian system.  To Weber and the leadership of the GDR, it made no 
difference if the population was satisfied or not with the public goods they received from  
 
 
43 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 153. 
44 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 21. 
45 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology [Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft], eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 948-
954. 
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the government.  Their willingness to submit to the rule of the state was sufficient to 
maintain the legitimacy of the state.46  Nonetheless, its legitimacy began to deteriorate by 
the late eighties. 
Eric Honecker ruled the GDR with Soviet support for decades.  After the 
Hungarian border opened up in the fall of 1989, East German citizens streamed across in 
defiance of Honecker’s iron rule.  Uncontrolled emigration from East Germany and 
popular demonstrations in public squares loosened Honecker’s grip on power.  Within 
weeks, the public spectacle of defiance forced Honecker to resign and appoint a successor 
in attempt to maintain the integrity of the state.47  The public’s refusal to submit to the 
authority of the state undermined its legitimacy until the state finally disappeared and 
reunited with the democratic Federal Republic of Germany (i.e., West Germany) in 1990.   
Similarly, endogenic legitimacy is one of the primary obstacles in the 
development of Afghanistan. Though the government of President Karzai enjoys 
legitimacy from the residents of Kabul, the Taliban and other warlords challenge its 
authority in the surrounding countryside.  Many observers commenting on this situation 
disparagingly refer to President Karzai as the Mayor of Kabul.  These examples highlight 
Weber’s view that states maintain legitimacy as long as their citizens are willing to 
submit to the state’s domination and authority.  This definition describes an endogenic 
nature, which only partially explains the notion of legitimacy as it relates to the 
foundation of the modified hierarchy.  
Secondly, legitimacy has an external nature to it as well.  Speaking to this external 
component, Martin Wight describes legitimacy in the following way: 
…as the collective judgment of international society about the rightful 
membership of the family of nations; how sovereignty may be transferred; 
how state succession should be regulated, when large states break up into 
smaller, or several states combine into one.  It concerns the 
presuppositions of the region of discourse that international lawyers seek 
 
46 Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 954. 
47 Serge Schmemann, “East Germany Removes Honecker and His Protégé Takes His Place,” New 
York Times, sec. 2008, October 19, 1989, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DEEDE103CF93AA25753C1A96F948260&sec=&spo
n=&pagewanted=all (accessed November 8, 2008). 
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to reduce to juridical system when they write about the recognition of 
states.  It is the answer given by each generation to the fundamental, ever-
present question, what are the principles (if any) on which international 
society is founded?48 
Wight speaks to a de jure aspect of legitimacy related to the traditions of international 
norms.  It connotes a consensus from among an established community of states, 
international regimes, and other institutions of the world that are external to the nascent 
state.  They bestow “membership” upon the state thus giving it exogenic legitimacy.49  
Without consent of the community, polities cannot attain legitimacy as states.  An 
example illustrates this consensus at work.   
Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia demonstrates the notion of 
exogenic legitimacy.  Post Operation ALLIED FORCE Kosovo retained status as an 
autonomous yet integral part of Serbia.  After years of stalemated negotiations for full 
independence, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in February 
2008.  Yet, only forty-eight countries of the one hundred ninety-two members of the 
United Nations have recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty to date.50  The United States 
contends that consensus is building over time and a majority of the world’s recognized 
states will eventually grant Kosovo membership into the community of states where de 
facto independence will morph into de jure sovereignty.51   
Conversely, Serbia, Russia, and other states flatly refuse to accept Kosovo’s 
independence, and many more states are simply unsure of the legality of Kosovo’s 
unilateral decision.  To resolve the matter of legality, the United Nations General 
Assembly voted in 2008 to refer the dispute over Kosovo’s independence to the World 
 
48 Martin Wight, “International Legitimacy,” International Relations 4 (May 1972): 1. 
49 Ian Clark, “Legitimacy in a Global Order,” Review of International Studies 29, no. S1 (December 1, 
2003): 80, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1410823951&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD
&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226167176&clientId=11969 (accessed November 8, 
2008). 
50 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Independent States in the World,” United States Department 
of State, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (accessed November 8, 2008). 
51 Margaret Besheer, “UN General Assembly to Ask ICJ for Ruling on Kosovo Independence,” Voice 
of America, http://voanews.com/english/2008-10-08-voa45.cfm?renderforprint=1 (accessed November 8, 
2008). 
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Court at The Hague for a legal ruling according to international law.52  With anarchy in 
the international system, it is still unclear whether a ruling by the court will definitively 
decide the matter.  Yet, its decision could sway world opinion and influence the 
consensus the U.S. hopes to build over time.   
Interestingly, such rulings were not necessary with the split of the former state of 
Czechoslovakia into separate Czech and Slovak states.  This decision was uncontested by 
any party resulting in minimal time between de facto independence and du jure 
sovereignty for both polities.  The division of Czechoslovakia into two distinct Czech and 
Slovak states highlights their success in obtaining both internal and external legitimacy.   
Therefore, states require both aspects of legitimacy to sustain them.  A polity’s 
failure to obtain membership into the international community of states likely results in 
its identity well short of state designation.  Likewise, a state whose population is 
unwilling to submit to its governing norms will not sustain itself over time.  
Consequently, establishing and maintaining a state’s internal and external legitimacy is 
its basic requirement and constitutes its most fundamental need on the modified 
hierarchy.  Once the state satisfies its first tier needs, it progresses up the modified 
hierarchy and attempts to satisfy its higher-level needs.     
C.  TIER TWO: INTERNAL SECURITY NEEDS 
After gratifying a preponderance of basic physiological needs, Maslow asserts 
individuals seek to satisfy safety needs associated with the second tier of the hierarchy.  
Protection from threat, pain, loss, and fear characterize these safety needs.53  He argues 
that unfulfilled safety needs breeds fear, which ultimately has a debilitating impact on a 
strong individual identity.  As an example, Maslow contends a toddler must feel content 
in knowing his mother is nearby providing him safety before he will muster the courage 
to venture off and explore the world around him.54  These excursions into the unknown 
 
52 “UN Refers Kosovo Independence to World Court,” Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3701015,00.html (accessed November 8, 2008). 
53 Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 46. 
54 Ibid., 46-9. 
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allow the toddler to grow and develop an individual and independent identity.  However, 
an individual’s perception of security is what matters to Maslow and not necessarily an 
objective determination of the actual security situation itself.  He explains:  
Assured safety permits higher needs and impulses to emerge and to grow 
towards mastery.  To endanger safety, means regression backward to the 
more basic foundation. What this means is that in the choice between 
giving up safety or giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out. Safety 
needs are prepotent over growth needs…In general, only a child who feels 
safe dares to grow forward healthily.  His safety needs must be gratified.  
He can't be pushed ahead, because the ungratified safety needs will remain 
forever underground, always calling for satisfaction…55  
Just as Maslow was interested in an individual’s perception of his safety needs, so 
are intelligence analysts interested in states’ perceptions of their internal security needs 
and the actions they take in order to satisfy them.  Security needs play a very important 
role in the development of nascent countries into strong states.  Thus, the second tier of 
the states’ hierarchy focuses on the maintenance of public order and satisfaction of 
internal security needs in the development of a strong state identity. 
As a result, states must mitigate or eliminate entirely any challenge to their 
authority in order to progress towards a strong state identity.  Max Weber famously 
defined the state as a “…compulsory political association with…a claim to the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”56  Specific 
phenomena from time to time may undermine a state’s ability to provide public goods 
desired by its citizens and can become the seeds of discontent.  As discontent sometimes 
grows into direct challenges to the state’s monopoly on force, it greatly affects how the 
state views its own security situation.  The longer a state’s internal security needs go 
unmet and the greater insecurity it perceives within its own borders, the more time, 
energy, and resources it must devote to addressing these internal security needs and divert 
the same resources away from international concerns.  
 
55 The italicized words are stresses made by Maslow. Ibid., 49. 
56 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1997), 154. 
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At the root of any domestic challenge to the state is the desire to distinguish 
between “us” and “them.”  Groups within societies attempt to define the “other” to 
further define themselves.  One goal of the hierarchy’s second tier is to discern the extent 
a state distinguishes the “other” within its own borders and whether this designation can 
lead to violence.  Further investigation into some examples of economic, social, and 
political means of defining the “other” demonstrates their impact on the satisfaction of 
second tier needs and their threat to the development of a strong state identity.   
Economic phenomena exist which potentially impact the satisfaction of a state’s 
internal security needs.  Since the repudiation of Communism inherent in the fall of the 
Soviet Bloc in 1991, capitalism became the primary theory for organizing the world 
economy and a majority of states comprising the international system.57  A definition 
containing the most common elements of a capitalist system is:  
…an economic system where private actors are allowed to own and 
control the use of property in accord with their own interests, and where 
the invisible hand of the pricing mechanism [through competition] 
coordinates supply and demand in markets in a way that is automatically 
in the best interests of society.58  
Interestingly, capitalism itself can undermine a state’s authority.  The market 
seeks to allocate world resources irrespective of national borders according to a 
competitive pricing system of supply and demand.59  Multinational corporations such as 
Sony, General Motors, and Phillips stand as testaments to capitalism’s reach beyond state 
borders.  Additionally, “creative destruction” is a constitutive feature of capitalism where 
inefficient and uncompetitive firms cease to exist and the more efficient firms survive to 
fight another day.60   
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Sometimes firms undermine a state’s sovereignty in order to maximize their 
profits and remain competitive in the marketplace.  One such example was a group of 
investors headed by George Soros.  The group made billions of dollars in the 1990s by 
manipulating the monetary reserves of Thailand.  Their manipulation undermined 
Thailand’s economic stability and ultimately spurred the 1997 Asian financial meltdown 
crippling the economies throughout the Pacific region.61  This incident demonstrates 
capitalism’s nature of creating winners and losers within some of the same transactions.  
Consequently, capitalism potentially creates societal dichotomies, which further 
exacerbate capitalism’s inherent nature to undermine state authority.   
Within a capitalist economic framework, competition begins to create different 
dichotomies within society.  These dichotomies draw distinctions between societal 
groups and impede the satisfaction of internal security needs.  A classic example of one 
such dichotomy is the Marxist differentiation between the so-called workers and owners 
of the means of production.  Marxist interpretation of history sees class struggle between 
these two groups as the primary cause of violence within industrialized states.62  Modern 
day scholars speak of similar struggles between society’s “haves” and “have-nots” often 
expressed in the inequality of income distribution and measured by the Gini Index.63  
Numerous other economic related dichotomies also exist such as agricultural/industrial, 
skilled/unskilled, urban/rural, etc.  Many times populations observing great disparity in 
the distribution of wealth use social phenomena to explain or justify the results of market 
forces creating economic winners and losers.           
Social forces within states have the potential to become serious obstacles in the 
satisfaction of second tier internal security needs.  Though there are potentially an infinite  
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number of these social forces, an example of one is the three thousand year notion of 
nationalism.64  According to Rick Fawn, Adam D. Smith provides the classical definition 
of nationalism as:  
…an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, 
unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its 
members to constitute an actual or potential [nation].65       
Closer inspection of this definition reveals nationalism is a double-edged sword 
capable of both positive and negative impacts on state development.  The unifying 
property of nationalism enabled the consolidation of European states from the ashes of 
the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century.  Though scholars attribute the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 as the origin of the modern state system, many see nationalism (often 
resulting from common language, culture, and heritage) as the unifying force of disparate 
peasants and their rulers into cohesive polities known as states.  Commenting on this 
phenomenon, Fawn says, “Security in a national identity provides a powerful existential 
benefit.”66  In this regard, nationalism had a positive impact on development for states 
such as France and Holland, yet nationalism’s impact is not always unifying and positive.    
Smith’s definition also speaks to autonomy as a characteristic of nationalism.  
Fawn credits the French Revolution of 1789 as the beginning of the modern ideology of 
nationalism.67  Successive waves of societal atomization have hit Europe since that time 
where populations of large states jettisoned a common state identity.  They subsequently 
broke up into smaller states along national or ethnic identities seeking autonomy from the 
control of the central government.  Agitation and violence along these ethnic cleavages 
often times precede the devolution of these states as political entities.  Though not always 
violent, the former countries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia provide examples of devolved states resulting from the impact of 
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competing nationalisms.68  Though nationalism can be a strong obstacle to the 
satisfaction of second tier needs, other social forces can also impede the development of a 
strong state identity. 
Religion, sometimes intertwined and indistinguishable from ethnicities who are its 
primary practitioners, is another example of a social phenomenon capable of preventing 
the satisfaction of internal security needs.  Like nationalism, religion can erect barriers 
between populations and is another means to distinguish “them” from “us.”  Historically, 
religion has had both a unifying and a destabilizing effect on states.  For example, 
Judaism provided an important facet for a common identity in the consolidation of the 
state of Israel while differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims continue to destabilize 
the modern state of Iraq.   
Conversely, the occurrence of violence in the Northern Ireland during the 1970s 
and 80s demonstrates how religious and ethnic causal factors sometimes blur together.  
Was violence in Northern Ireland the result of a rift between Protestantism and 
Catholicism, or was it merely a religious veneer covering an ethnic rivalry between the 
Irish and Scotts-Irish?  Regardless of the answer, the population viewed the “other” as 
internal to the polity and not external to it demonstrating a social phenomena that can 
impede satisfaction of internal security needs.  Several other examples of destabilizing 
forces lie outside of the state’s social dynamics.  
Political phenomena designating the “other” as internal to the state can also slow 
the satisfaction of internal security needs.  Michael Burleigh attributes similar unifying 
and destabilizing characteristics to what he called “political or secular religions.”69  He 
includes Jacobism, Bolshevism, and National Socialism as a few examples of political 
religions.70  Their goal is not necessarily to replace theistic religion but to co-opt its 
ability to unify a polity or distinguish the “other” within it (e.g., revolutionaries from 
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monarchists, party members from non-party members, or Aryans from non-Aryans).  
This is one example of political phenomena that differentiates subgroups within states.  
Numerous others exist which accomplish the same result. 
Once subgroup identities internal to a state become prepotent over a common 
national identity, it becomes much easier to delineate artificially “winners” and “losers” 
in the competition for state resources.  In this situation, states can direct highly prized 
goods towards one group while denying them to another or “the other.”  For example, 
many think of security as the quintessential public good which is difficult to divide 
between society’s winners and losers.  However, the German Kristallnacht of 1938 and 
the subsequent Jewish pogroms demonstrate how security is divisible between societal 
groups in certain situations.  The prepotency of subgroup identities over a national 
identity essentially opens the door to other political phenomena, which potentially 
irritates societal groups until the animosity grows into a direct challenge to the state’s 
monopoly on force.   
Corruption, favoritism, and nepotism are other examples of political phenomena 
which step through the door opened by the distinction of a state’s internal “other.”  
Corruption, or the misuse of public office for private gain, is the nexus of where 
economic and social phenomena come together to influence the allocation of state 
resources through the political process.71  Corrupt officials can direct state resources 
towards members of the same clan/tribal group or possibly towards former business 
partners as is often alleged against American presidential administrations.  Other times, 
government officials simply allocate resources to the highest bidder for nothing more 
than their own personal enrichment.  Corruption’s impact on states and economies can be 
devastating.  In fact, Charles Wheelan says corruption is “not merely an inconvenience, 
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discourages foreign investment.”72  In spite of the devastating effects of corruption and 
the other obstacles on the satisfaction of internal security needs, the solution appears 
deceivingly simple.           
Successive U.S. presidential administrations have seen democratic government as 
the best solution to these problems.  The goal of each administration was for new 
democracies to mitigate violence by providing disaffected groups within a state equal 
opportunity under the law to resolve their grievances.  Proponents of democracy see 
equality under the law and procedural transparency through impartial institutions as the 
key to peaceful conflict resolution.  They do not necessarily believe that democracy 
ensures the formation of a prepotent national identity; however, they contend that 
democracy can keep societal tensions from boiling over into violence.  Consequently, 
American presidents have used U.S. instruments of power as carrots and sticks to 
encourage the creation of democracies throughout the world.73  Commenting on this 
view from an academic perspective, Larry Diamond says the followi
The essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal 
embrace of democratic principles and methods by both elites and 
mass…the political institutions of democracy must become more coherent, 
capable, and autonomous, so that all major political players are willing to 
commit to and be bound by their rules and norms...democracy [must] 
effectively address society's most pressing problems and, perhaps more 
important, provide the liberty, accountability, and responsiveness that 
citizens uniquely expect from democracy and the order that they expect 
from any government.74  
Should economic, social, and political obstacles to the satisfaction of internal 
security needs become overwhelming, they may potentially manifest themselves into 
direct and violent challenges to the state’s authority.  Crime syndicates, warlords, 
insurgents, separatists, and terror groups are all examples of groups directly challenging a 
state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force and grow out of the differentiations 
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within states as a result of the phenomena mentioned above.  As the state attempts to 
address its unmet internal security needs because of the threat posed by these groups, it 
must increasingly allocate more of its finite resources away from its other interests.  An 
example demonstrates the reallocation of resources sometimes necessary to address 
unmet internal security needs. 
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 provides a clear example of a state’s 
reallocation of resources to meet its unmet internal security needs.  After the February 
Revolution of 1917, the Russian Provisional Government maintained its support for the 
war against Germany.  With Russia’s army still deployed in the field, Russia’s internal 
security situation continued to deteriorate during 1917.  Lenin and his Bolsheviks took 
advantage of the instability within the country and launched the October coup against 
Alexander’s Kerensky’s government.75  Knowing he had little time to consolidate his 
hold on power after the coup, Lenin saw the retrenchment of Russian foreign policy 
initiatives as a matter of life and death.  He sought to end the war with Germany almost at 
any cost in order to bring the army home and use them in expanding his power over the 
entire country.  Summarizing this situation, Richard Pipes says that “in Lenin’s judgment, 
unless his government promptly concluded an armistice, it would not survive.”76   
Consequently, needs for internal security become prepotent over its other higher 
level needs.  Further regression down the hierarchy resulting from the state’s inability to 
meet these needs adequately can ultimately endanger the state’s legitimacy and 
inaugurate its devolution.  Conversely, adequately satisfying its internal security needs 
allows the state to progress to the next level of the hierarchy where external security 
needs take precedence.  
D.  TIER THREE: EXTERNAL SECURITY NEEDS  
The third tier of this project marks a significant departure from concepts in 
Maslow’s original theory.  Maslow’s third tier concerns an individual’s need for 
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belonging.  Human desire for companionship and acceptance among peer groups are 
examples of belonging needs.77  However, this project will further investigate the impact 
security has on state behavior before contemplating the impact of higher-level needs.   
Safety and security for states is a much more complex concept due to the internal 
and external nature of state security.  The internal nature of safety and security explained 
by the second tier of the states’ hierarchy analyzes the impact of states’ free-thinking, 
dynamic internal components on state behavior.  Whereas, the third tier of the state’s 
hierarchy focuses on the external nature of state security and a state’s interaction with its 
external environment.   
Maslow addressed the external nature of safety and security but did not assign it a 
unique level within his hierarchy.  He characterizes the need for safety, belonging, love, 
and respect as needs that “can only be satisfied from outside the person.”78  In his view, 
the environment influences these needs to a large extent.  Explaining this assertion, 
Maslow says:  
This means considerable dependence on the environment.  A person in this 
dependent position cannot really be said to be governing himself, or in 
control of his own fate…This is the same as saying that he must adapt and 
adjust by being flexible and responsive and by changing himself to fit the 
external situation.  He is the dependent variable; the environment is the 
fixed, independent variable.  Because of this, the deficiency-motivated 
man must be more afraid of the environment, since there is always the 
possibility that it may fail or disappoint him.79 
Outside aggression and external security is a critical concept for states.  Many 
scholars argue the creation of states and the modern international state system resulted 
directly from external security concerns and the incidence of war.  In fact, Charles Tilly  
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famously declared “War made the state and the state made war.”80  In this regard, he 
explains European state development as a direct result of different methods used for 
preparation and prosecution of war.81   
For Tilly, war resulted from the desire of Europeans to coerce “money, goods, 
deference, and access to pleasures” from their weaker, less capable peers.82  Highly 
centralized and thus better organized polities usually succeeded over their less organized 
and decentralized opponents.  Successful European polities established buffer zones 
patrolled by armies to secure their newly acquired spoils of war.  As centralized polities 
began to increase their populations and territory, their buffer zones began to overlap with 
each other leading to conflict among them.83  Explaining this model of state development 
as a result of war and its diffusion throughout the world as the default developmental 
pattern, Tilly says:  
Why national states? National states won out in the world as a whole 
because they first won out in Europe, whose states then acted to reproduce 
themselves.  They won in Europe because the most powerful states – 
France and Spain before all others – adopted forms of warfare that 
temporarily crushed their neighbors, and whose support generated as by-
products centralization, differentiation, and autonomy of the state 
apparatus.84        
Assignment to the third tier of the states’ hierarchy reflects a state which has 
attained internal and external legitimacy to satisfy its first tier needs.  It has also has 
sufficiently neutralized any internal threats to its authority and is capable of producing 
public goods for its population.  Yet, it is unable to mitigate fully external threats to its 
sovereignty and safeguard its population from external aggression and must devote  
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substantial resources to address these external security needs.  These external security 
needs can revolve around a state’s physical sense of security as well as its economic 
security.    
One of the primary responsibilities a state must accomplish is the maintenance of 
its external legitimacy by protecting its populations from external threats.  The Realist 
notion of the Security Dilemma, or never ending arms races that results from states 
seeking to gain security advantages over each other, can greatly influence the behavior of 
states assigned to this level of the hierarchy.  Shiping Tang contends that “geographic 
barriers, state-to-state interactions, international structure, and military technology” are 
four factors that shape a state’s security environment.85  Additionally, he proposes 
observers measure the degree of a state’s self-restraint vis-à-vis the security dilemma to 
ascertain its level of insecurity within the security environment created by these four 
factors.  The more self-restrained a state is in its behavior, the less threatened it is by the 
behavior of neighboring states.86  Conversely, the opposite holds true as well.  An 
example demonstrates these forces at work. 
In the years following World War I, France feared a resurgent Germany capable 
of launching offensives in a new war.  By 1929, France had begun construction on a 
comprehensive defense perimeter of static forts on its frontier with Germany known as 
the Maginot Line.  The concept behind the Maginot Line was to slow a potential German 
invasion down to give France the three weeks necessary for mobilization of its reserve 
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demonstrates behavior of a state focused on its external security needs and unable to 
progress up the hierarchy of needs to a strong state identity.  This represents only one 
aspect of security reflected in the third tier of the hierarchy. 
A critical aspect of a state’s security environment is a stable economic 
environment.  Consequently, a state’s economic security plays a role in satisfaction of its 
external security needs.  Economic security is a difficult term to define; however, it 
entails aspects of a state’s economic vulnerability to other states and “concerns access to 
the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and 
state power.”88  An example demonstrates how a state’s perception of economic 
vulnerability can trigger regression down the hierarchy and precipitate conflict. 
Many observers cite Japan’s reliance on U.S. oil shipments as a major cause for 
conflict between the two states during World War II.  Japan in 1940 was a country with 
limited territory and a limited supply of natural resources.  It absolutely relied on access 
to raw materials gained from foreign markets to drive its economy.  It clearly saw 
economic stability as a foreign policy priority. In 1940, the Japanese government 
concluded that access to raw materials through territorial expansion was in the interest of 
Japanese national security.  Unfortunately for Japan, the empire obtained a majority of its 
oil from the United States and was fearful of losing this primary source of energy as 
retribution for Japanese aggression against the British and Dutch in the South Pacific.89  
President Roosevelt skillfully used U.S. shipments of oil to deter Japanese aggression in 
the South Pacific throughout the spring and summer of 1941.  However, U.S. 
bureaucratic infighting undermined Roosevelt’s efforts of deterrence by creating a de 
facto oil embargo on Japanese oil imports.  The embargo greatly deteriorated relations 
between the two states and put them on a collision course by August 1941.  The Japanese 
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saw access to oil as a matter of survival for the Japanese state.  Economic vulnerability 
led directly to the Imperial Navy’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in December 1941.90  
This example demonstrates the close relationship between economic and physical 
security.   
In the modern era, states see economic security as a primary foreign policy 
objective.  Reflecting the importance of economic security in the formulation of Russian 
national security policy, President Vladimir Putin said during his infamous Munich 
speech in February 2007:   
It is well known that international security comprises much more than 
issues relating to military and political stability.  It involves the stability of 
the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and 
developing a dialogue between civilisations.91 
Additionally, Estonia lists economic security through diversification of its external 
economic relationships (i.e., partners other than Russia) as one of its top national security 
objectives.92 Estonia assesses its gas and electrical system’s dependence on “foreign 
monopolistic energy systems and suppliers” as a threat of an economic origin.93  
Economic security is also a critical component of U.S. national security policy.  For 
example, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2006 seems to consider North Korean 
currency counterfeiting operations, narcotics trafficking activities, and missile 
provocations as equal threats to U.S. security.94   
The third tier of the states’ hierarchy reflects both the physical and economic 
nature of security.  States seek protection against external physical forces as well as 
guaranteed access to markets that ensures a stable economic environment.  States at this 
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level of development have satisfied needs to maintain their internal legitimacy; however, 
they have not sufficiently satisfied their needs guaranteeing external legitimacy.  Their 
policies must help create a stable economic and security environment before it can pursue 
prestige needs on the fourth tier of the hierarchy. 
E.  TIER FOUR: PRESTIGE NEEDS 
Maslow’s fourth tier discusses the importance of esteem needs to human 
development of a strong identity.  He credits fulfillment of these needs as freeing the 
individual from “…inhibitions, cautions, fears, doubts, controls, reservations, [and] self-
criticism…” and draws a distinction between two facets of these needs.95  First, one must 
have respect for oneself and, secondly, receive respect from others.  Characterizing the 
impact of these needs, Maslow says: 
All people in our society…have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, 
(usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, 
and for the esteem of others.  By firmly based self-esteem, we mean that 
which is soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from 
others.  These needs may be classified into two subsidiary sets.  These are, 
first, the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for confidence 
in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom.  Secondly, we 
have what we may call the desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as 
respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or 
appreciation….Satisfaction of the self-esteem needs leads to feelings of 
self confidence, worth, strength, capability and adequacy of being useful 
and necessary in the world.  But thwarting of these needs produces 
feelings of inferiority, of weakness and of helplessness.96 
Esteem, or prestige, is also an important characteristic for states as well.  Just as 
respect for oneself and respect from others frees individuals from inhibitions and 
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Therefore, the fourth tier of the modified hierarchy of states’ needs explores the success 
states achieve in the satisfaction of prestige needs.  Similar to esteem needs for human 
beings, states’ pursuit for prestige is also multifaceted and complex.   
Maslow defines prestige as a concept bestowed upon an entity from an external 
source.  It was Cardinal Richelieu and his pursuit of French raison d’état that made 
prestige in the sixteenth century almost synonymous with reputation.97  Interestingly, the 
etymology of the word traces back to the Latin word praestigiae meaning “quick finger” 
or “juggler’s tricks.”98  In fact, prestige shares the same root as the modern word of 
prestidigitation (i.e., magic through sleight of hand) where deception is part of their 
mutual historical meanings.   
It is in regard to these nuances that state prestige differs slightly from Maslow’s 
definition of esteem “…which is soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and 
respect from others.”99  Many times perception is the primary basis of state prestige and 
does not necessarily reflect real capacity or state power at all.  For instance, U.S. prestige 
between the two world wars did not accurately reflect its growing power and influence.  
A situation Hans Morgenthau referred to as negative power.100  Conversely, France’s 
prestige during the same time period did not reflect its declining power and influence 
which Morgenthau called a policy of bluff.101  Generally speaking, though, an increase in 
one (i.e., power, influence, or prestige) reflects a similar increase in the others.  
Reflecting the involvement of perception to the concept of prestige, Gregory Copely 
likens it to a credit rating of state influence and power.  Just as individual credit ratings 
reflect credit history as well as other factors beyond an objective assessment of current 
capability, so does prestige reflect a similar state capability.     
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Prestige is the credit rating of countries.  A country with a good credit 
rating attracts savings, investments and experts, provided the foreign 
owners of the assets also have confidence in the country's political ability.  
A country with a bad credit rating and a declining currency suffers from 
capital flight.102 
These subtleties represent just some of the complexities involving states’ pursuit 
of prestige.  A state’s modern interest for prestige revolves around three dichotomies 
associated with it.  Prestige has internal and external dimensions, reflects both hard and 
soft power, and simultaneously reinforces equality and inequality among states in the 
international system. 
The first dichotomy is the internal and external nature of prestige.  Maslow 
alludes to an internal and external component of esteem where self-esteem grows from 
inside the individual while external entities bestow prestige from outside the individual.  
State prestige functions in a somewhat similar fashion though self-esteem does not 
originate from the state itself but rather from the state’s constituent population.   
Populations bestow prestige on the state for a variety of reasons.  The state may 
efficiently disperse public goods to its population and earn the respect of its citizens.  
Additionally, a state, such as Egypt, may enjoy respect from its population because it 
represents an ancient civilization whose accomplishments impacted the modern world.  
Or, a state may exert a great deal of influence in the international system and bring glory 
to its people who thus bestow internal prestige upon it.  The internal prestige bestowed 
upon the U.S. by its population is a good example of this phenomenon and also illustrates 
another facet of state prestige. 
States also gain external prestige from other states in the international system.  
International, or external, prestige stems from a variety of sources.  One means to gain 
prestige is from military capability demonstrated through victories on the battlefield or  
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fielding advanced weapons system.  Great Britain during the nineteenth century enjoyed 
great external prestige from defeating Napoleon at Waterloo and fielding the most 
powerful navy of the time.   
Additionally, economic power can increase state prestige.  Since the end of World 
War II, the role of Japan’s military is as a self-defense force only.  Despite Japan’s 
relegation of its military capability to the back bench, it has enjoyed great external 
prestige for its economic strength.  Today, Japan is an economic powerhouse and exerts 
great influence throughout international markets.  The coercive capability of military and 
economic power defines hard power and underscores the second dichotomy associated 
with state prestige. 
Prestige can reflect both soft and hard power.  Joseph Nye, one of the first 
scholars to explore the concept of soft power, defines it as “the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”103  As previously stated, hard 
power is coercion through the use of military or economic power.104  Each demonstrates 
different nuances of state prestige. 
Hard power is the traditional use of economic carrots and military sticks to 
influence another state’s behavior.  It is traditional in the sense that empires historically 
used military force or monetary incentives to coerce an adversary into a more amenable 
position.105  The common expression “turn it into a desert and call it peace” reflects this 
historical use of hard power.  Similarly, Youngho Kim draws a distinction between 
negative prestige acquired through brutality and positive prestige gained from restraint.106  
As an example of negative prestige, Kim asserts Athens during the Peloponnesian War 
increased its prestige and thus its power as a result of “naked force” and brutality used 
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against the Melians.107  Athens saw Melian submission as an enhancement to its 
international prestige and thus critical to accomplishing its foreign policy objectives with 
regards to other Greek city-states.108     
Prestige gained from hard power can provide states with concrete strategic 
benefits.  Copely’s previous metaphor of a state credit rating highlights two benefits 
states obtain by acquiring a high amount of international prestige.  One benefit is 
deterrence.  Adversaries are less likely to challenge a state’s actual military capability if it 
enjoys a high rate of prestige regarding the perception of its hard power.109  Thus, Athens 
saw prestige gained from the sacking of Melos as a deterrent to similar defections from 
other lesser Greek powers.110  States obtain other benefits as well from high levels of 
prestige.  
A second benefit is prestige’s impact on a state’s decision to bandwagon or 
balance against threats.  If balancing is developing allies against a threat, then 
bandwagoning is allying with the threatening state itself.111  Scholars disagree on the 
causal mechanisms involved in the decision to balance or bandwagon; however, many 
agree that balancing is a behavior primarily done by more powerful states against each 
other while weaker more isolated states bandwagon when confronted by threats.  State 
prestige influences the decision to balance or bandwagon in two ways.  First, larger states 
may choose to balance against threats in an effort to retain “credibility” as a strong, 
independent power rather than bandwagon with the aggressor.112  Secondly, prestige of 
potential allies weighted against the prestige of aggressors can impact a weaker state’s 
decision to balance or bandwagon.  For example, the Soviet Union ultimately decided to 
 
107 Kim, Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?, 43. 
108 Ibid., 44. 
109 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 218-19. 
110 Kim, Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?, 43-4. 
111 David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of 
Realism and Liberalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 18. 
112 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (Spring 1985): 18, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28198521%299%3A4%3C3%3AAFATBO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K (accessed November 8, 2008).  
 43
                                                
bandwagon with an aggressive Nazi Germany instead of balancing against it in an 
alliance with France or Great Britain.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact reflects the Soviet’s 
perception of superior German capability and prestige when compared to the French, yet 
hard power is not the only means to achieve bandwagoning and influence state behavior.     
Soft power influences state behavior as well.  Nye argues the attractiveness of a 
state’s culture and ideas can influence the behavior of other states in the international 
system mitigating any need for coercive or hard power.113  Essentially, winning the 
hearts and minds of populations around the world can augment hard power and 
sometimes achieve foreign policy objectives without the use of economic carrots and 
military sticks.  Kim’s concept of positive prestige gained from restrained state behavior 
parallels Nye’s concept of soft power.114  Kim cites British restraint in acquiring territory 
and exploiting the spoils of war after its victory over Napoleon as a great source of 
international prestige.  At the time, British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh ultimately saw 
the increase in international prestige from London’s restraint as translating directly into 
an increase in British state power.115   
Another example demonstrating this concept is the attractiveness of democratic 
ideals as a source of U.S. soft power against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  
Great Britain and other states in the international system saw the U.S. as occupying the 
moral high ground when compared to the totalitarian Soviet Union.  This made them 
more willing to adopt positions favorable to Washington at the expense of Moscow.  This 
example highlights the role prestige plays in the relationship between powerful and less 
powerful states and introduces the third dichotomy associated with state prestige.   
Prestige can reflect both inequality and equality in the international system.  This 
project has so far focused on prestige as a reflection of inequality among states.  In this 
regard, prestige is a measurement of the perceived hard and soft power a state possesses.  
Generally speaking, strong states seek to maintain high international prestige while 
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weaker states attempt to bolster their prestige.  States initiate wars, host Olympic Games, 
and seek new economic markets partly in an attempt to increase or maintain their 
international prestige, for prestige is ultimately a reflection of perceived state power and 
influence.  Nonetheless, some observers of international relations contend that prestige 
can reflect more than the inequality of state power. 
Participation and membership in international institutions also bring prestige to 
states and reflect the concept of equality in the international system.  Membership in 
international institutions and regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, gives strong 
and weak states a seat at the table and an equal voice.  It minimizes the impact of the 
hierarchy of power and promotes equality of states within the international system.116  
Besides the specific tangible benefits membership in international institutions may bring 
(e.g., removal of tariffs on products), it can elevate the prestige of a state.  While 
elevating the prestige of weaker states, membership in international institutions can 
simultaneously minimize the power advantage of stronger states.  For example, Iceland is 
a small island nation with little indigenous defense capability, yet NATO membership 
elevates its prestige and nominally makes it an equal to the U.S. in decision making for 
security of the Euro-Atlantic community.  Thus, prestige gained from membership in 
international institutions can promote equality in the international system and 
demonstrates the final dichotomy associated with prestige.     
Therefore, the fourth level of the modified hierarchy of states’ needs reflects a 
state’s attempt to satisfy its prestige needs.  Fourth tier needs have an internal component 
where a state’s population bestows prestige upon it.  It also reflects the external nature of 
prestige where a state’s prestige reflects its standing among peer in the international 
system.  The fourth tier also reflects both hard and soft power associated with 
international prestige.  Not only does prestige reflect the perception of military and 
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e continues by saying:   
                                                
international prestige reflects both equality and inequality in the international system.  
Upon satisfaction of the state’s prestige needs, states progress to the fifth tier of the 
modified hierarchy.       
F.  TIER FIVE: STRONG STATE IDENTITY  
After gratifying a preponderance of basic needs as explained by the first four tiers 
of the hierarchy, Maslow asserts individuals attain the hierarchy’s fifth tier known as 
Self-Actualization.117  A quick summary of Maslow’s very complicated and thorough 
definition of self-actualization is a person with a strong, unified sense of identity capable 
of frequent moments of “peak experience.”118  He explains these experiences as 
moments when “the powers of the person come together in a particularly 
efficient…way…in which he is more integrated and less split…fully functioning…more 
independent of his lower needs….”119  H
The person in peak-experiences feels himself, more than at other times, to 
be the responsible, active, creating center of his activities and of his 
perceptions.  He feels more like a prime mover, more self-determined 
(rather than caused, determined, helpless, dependent, passive, weak, 
bossed).  He feels himself to be his own boss, fully responsible, fully 
volitional, with more “free will” than at other times, master of his fate, an 
agent.120 
Additionally, attaining self-actualization and the fifth tier of the hierarchy is not 
an end-state in itself.  Nor does it reflect a static condition where the individual is absent 
any significant problems.121  Rather, self-actualization is a dynamic situation where peak 
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actualized person different from others experiencing similar moments of peak 
experiences is the frequency and intensity of these moments when compared to the 
average person.122  Yet, how do these characteristics apply to states?       
States also seek to develop a strong, unified identity in order to function 
efficiently.  States assessed at the fifth tier of the hierarchy have sufficiently established 
their legitimacy; they have mitigated challenges to their internal and external security; 
and they have established a good “credit rating” with negative or positive prestige.123  
States in this situation are more efficient at providing public goods than their counterparts 
regressing or stagnating at lower levels of the hierarchy.  These less efficient states must 
devote a higher percentage of their resources than their strong state peers to deliver basic 
public goods necessary to sustain the state’s legitimacy, security, and prestige.  
Conversely, development into a strong state identity minimizes challenges to the state’s 
authority and frees up state resources.  Ultimately, flexibility in resource allocation 
allows the state to deliver higher level public goods to its citizenry, some of which could 
include well built transportation infrastructure, functioning institutions which promote 
social equality and economic equal opportunity, or even free health and child care.  
Ultimately, this efficiency gives states more freedom and flexibility in their interactions 
with other states in the international system.     
Consequently, states with a strong, unified identity also perceive themselves as 
less dependent and more fully volitional.  Strong states have more flexibility in how they 
pursue foreign policy objectives.  They are more capable of setting the agenda rather than 
reacting to another state’s agenda.  Additionally, strong states capable of setting the 
agenda have more flexibility in the instruments of national power they leverage to 
accomplish their foreign policy objectives.  In fact, states which progressed up the 
hierarchy to a strong state identity may possess enough power and influence to change 
preexisting international or regional structures to benefit themselves at the expense of 
weaker states in the system.  Yet, this assertion prompts an important question.  What is 
the relationship between a strong state identity and hegemony?    
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States with strong identities are not necessarily hegemons.  Conversely, all system 
hegemons have developed strong state identities.  Critical to this assertion is a working 
definition of the very complicated and controversial notion of hegemony. 
This thesis adopts David Wilkinson’s definition of hegemony.  Hegemony means 
more than the simple unequal distribution of power in bilateral relations.  It is 
synonymous with domination of the international state system in both politico-military 
capability and international influence.124  Attaining both constitutes a system hegemon 
where attaining capability without equal influence results in a unipolar world without 
hegemony.125  This definition includes realist assumptions of domination while also 
including socialist assumptions of influence.126  Additionally, it differentiates between 
great powers and true hegemons in the international state system.127  Yet, this definition 
does not clarify the relationship between states with strong identities and hegemons.   
Great power and hegemon are comparative terms that reflect the distribution of 
power among states in the international system.  State A has more politico-military 
capability and influence than state B; thus, it is a greater power than state B.  State A is a 
regional power if its capability and influence surpasses that of other states in the region.  
Yet, this distinction does not necessarily denote achievement of the hierarchy’s fifth tier.  
Since these are comparative terms, it merely describes a state which has attained more 
capability and influence than others in the region.  Additionally, state A is a hegemon if 
its capability and influence surpass all other states in the entire system.  These terms 
reflect a different point of view than an assessment of a state with a strong identity.   
Assessment of a strong state identity is an objective observation without any 
connotation of comparison to other states in the system.  It assesses the behavior of a 
single state to determine the needs driving that behavior.  With this in mind, states such 
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as Sweden could have a strong state identity and not be a great power or a system 
hegemon.  Conversely, states such as Russia can be regional powers and still not achieve 
the fifth tier on the hierarchy.  Yet, other states such as Japan and Great Britain can attain 
a strong state identity and great/regional power status.  The question is not whether a state 
has achieved more legitimacy, internal/external security, or prestige than other states.  
The questions is has the state achieved a sufficient amount of these attributes to satisfy its 
own needs.  If it has, it likely results in a change of behavior while it pursues needs at a 
new level.  This ultimately underscores the dynamic nature of the hierarchy. 
Much like Maslow’s self-actualized person, a strong state identity is not a static 
condition.  As internal or external forces change the circumstances of the state, 
sometimes it regresses to lower levels of the hierarchy.  Terrorist attacks, economic 
downturns, revival of ethnic cleavages are a few examples of events capable of regressing 
states to lower levels of the hierarchy.  Two examples highlight dynamicism in state 
development. 
The terrorist attacks on September 11th had an immediate impact on status of the 
U.S. within the hierarchy.  The attacks initiated a regression of the U.S. down from a 
strong state identity confident in itself as the sole superpower in the world to a state 
trying to satisfy its third tier external security needs.  Though the immediate sense of 
vulnerability felt after the 9/11 attacks abated, the subsequent war in Iraq and economic 
recession keep the U.S. stagnant at satisfying its fourth tier needs for prestige.  China, on 
the other hand, provides evidence of a state progressing up the hierarchy.  China very 
likely has just transitioned from satisfying its fourth tier needs of prestige to a strong state 
identity after its success hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.  Yet, increased ethnic tensions 
in Tibet and its western province of Xinjiang could initiate a regression of China back 
down to lower levels of the hierarchy.  Each of these examples highlights the precarious 
nature of state identity.   
Therefore, states achieving the fifth and final tier of the modified hierarchy of 
states’ needs have adequately satisfied lower level needs of legitimacy, security, and 
prestige.  They have frequent moments of what Maslow called “peak experiences” where 
they become more efficient at providing public goods which leads to more autonomy in 
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pursuing foreign policy objectives.128  Additionally, states need not be a hegemon in the 
international state system to attain a fifth tier, strong state identity.  Once achieved, states 
can easily regress back down the hierarchy should their circumstances change.  
G. SUMMARY  
This approach will appear controversial to many observers and draw immediate 
criticism.  Some will question the legitimacy of bringing a prominent theory in the 
behavioral sciences to the political sciences.  Concerns of spurious results from 
ecological and individualistic fallacies will fuel other criticisms.  Still, others will 
discount Maslow’s theories as invalid and question his model’s use of a linear approach 
to needs satisfaction which would ultimately undermine the foundation of this thesis.  
Some political scientists might criticize the project’s assumption of rationality of a 
unitary actor and question the model’s representation of reality regarding foreign policy 
formulation.  With these criticisms in mind, the reader should remember what this thesis 
intends to accomplish. 
This project attempts to provide an additional tool to U.S. intelligence analysts 
and policy makers for assessing state intent.  It seeks to provide a simplistic model and 
operational framework to ascertain states’ intentions based on their developmental needs 
which drive their behaviors, for identifying nefarious intent is the most difficult part of 
determining when states become threats to U.S. interests.129  Determining states’ 
capability to do harm can be much easier than establishing their intent to do harm.  
Understanding the developmental needs of various states in the international system gives 
policy makers choices in the policies they choose.  They can attempt to block states from 
accomplishing their needs-based goals or attempt to understand the needs driving its 
behavior and help the state accomplish its goals in a more constructive manner.  This 
requires intelligence analysts to be familiar with a variety of disciplines to aid them in 
their work.   
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Good intelligence analysts use insights from the social sciences to formulate 
intelligence assessments.  They must have a working knowledge of military doctrine and 
understand the employment of various weapon systems.  They must understand the 
states’ political and decision making structures.  They must have knowledge of the 
history and to some degree the cultural-anthropology of specific regions of the world.  
Finally, they must be somewhat familiar with available political theory which attempts to 
anticipate state behavior.  In short, intelligence analysts must be part historian, 
anthropologist, military specialist, comparative political scientist, and an international 
relations expert.  In this regard, political theory certainly forms the foundation of the 
modified hierarchy’s various levels.   
This thesis embraces the body of knowledge presented by the political science 
community to explain the motivation behind state behavior; however, it does not rely on 
a single dogma or view of the world.  Rather, it suggests the modified hierarchy of needs 
makes various schools of political thought relevant depending on whether the observed 
subject is progressing, regressing, or remaining static within the hierarchy.  Simply put, it 
embraces a common proverb that a person’s view of the world depends on where he or 
she sits.  Whether cooperation among states is possible in an anarchic system depends on 
whether the states are progressing or regressing through the hierarchy.  Ultimately, the 
modified hierarchy defines the characteristics of a strong state just as Maslow defined the 
attributes of a strong individual.  This hierarchy explains state behavior as attempts to 
attain a strong state identity or to regain a strong state identity after it was lost.  Soviet 
and Russian history provide appropriate case studies to demonstrate this concept.130     
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III. RUSSIA AS A CASE STUDY  
A. SOVIET REGRESSION DOWN THE HIERARCHY 
1.  Introduction 
At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union appeared unstoppable.  It had 
rebounded from its initial losses during the early part of the war and strengthened to the 
point of defeating the brunt of Hitler’s eastern army.  By the end of 1949, it clearly sat at 
the fifth tier on the modified hierarchy of states’ needs and had consolidated a strong 
state identity.  It was one of two superpowers in the world and the leader of a worldwide 
ideological camp poised to form the international system in its own image.   
Yet, the Soviet Union began to slip and eventually regressed all the way down the 
hierarchy.  It bottomed out on the hierarchy trying to satisfy its first tier needs and 
ultimately failed to maintain its first tier internal legitimacy.  This chapter examines 
Soviet regression down the hierarchy to its eventual dissolution in 1991 and documents 
the Russian Federation’s eventual progression up the hierarchy as the primary successor 
state to the Soviet Union (Figure 3).  A brief description of the Soviet zenith of power 
begins this examination of the Soviet Union’s regression.   
This thesis assesses the Soviet Union at the fifth tier of the modified hierarchy of 
states’ needs by the end of 1949.  It had unchallenged internal and external legitimacy 
satisfying its first tier needs.  It had sufficiently satisfied its second tier domestic security 
needs through the purges and collectivization of the 1930s to eliminate any significant 
internal security threats.  Additionally, its victory over the Nazis secured its third tier 
external security needs and ushered in a period of great prestige for the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets had faced the brunt of the German war machine during World War II 
and had persevered to achieve total victory.  It created an overland empire from the 
remnants of the defeated Axis Powers that extended beyond any empire created by 
Russia’s tsars.  By 1949, the Soviet Union was Communism’s ideological leader, which 
had created new Communist governments across Europe and Asia and included the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China.  It had not only provided an alternative 
to capitalism and U.S. leadership in the international system, but it had provided a model 
to the rest of the world for rapid industrialization, a point underscored when the Soviet 
Union became only the second state in the world to detonate a nuclear weapon.  
Summarizing the zenith of Soviet power in 1949, Martin Malia concludes the following: 
In 1949 Communism came to power in China, and there now existed a 
great Red bloc extending from the Elbe to the Pacific. At the same time, 
there were powerful Communist insurgencies in Vietnam, Malaya, and the 
Philippines. When Stalin celebrated his seventieth birthday in 1949 with 
greater pomp than ever before, he indeed appeared as the “father of the 
peoples” to about a third of humanity; and it seemed as if the worldwide 


































































































































































Figure 3.   Soviet/Russian Status in the Hierarchy 1945-2006 
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2.  Regression from the Fifth Tier to the Fourth  
States seeking to satisfy fourth tier needs focus on the pursuit of prestige.  States 
enjoying high levels of prestige can act more autonomously and with less hesitation.  
State prestige encompasses internal as well as external aspects of prestige.  Though a 
state’s regression down the hierarchy is not necessarily linear in nature, there is evidence 



































Figure 4.   Soviet Regression from Fifth to Fourth Tier 
From 1956 until 1989, several domestic and international events slowly whittled 
away at Soviet prestige initiating its regression from a fifth tier strong state identity to the 
fourth tier on the hierarchy.  These events impacted the internal and external perception 
of Soviet prestige ultimately reducing its soft as well as hard power.  The first major 
event impacting Soviet prestige was the initiation of Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of de-
Stalinization.    
At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and the first since Stalin’s death in 1953, 
Nikita Khrushchev did what was once inconceivable during previous years in the Soviet 
Union.  He openly criticized the legacy and policies of Joseph Stalin.  His criticism began 
a period of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union that ultimately had a destabilizing impact 
 53
 54
                                                
on Soviet external and internal prestige.  Subsequently, events of 1956 began the 
regression of the Soviet Union down the hierarchy of needs.132  The initial impact of de-
Stalinization was on Soviet external prestige and its relations with its clients in Eastern 
Europe.        
Soviet external prestige began to diminish with the policy of de-Stalinization.  As 
senior Soviet leadership began to criticize Stalin’s policies during his tenure as General 
Secretary of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europeans began to criticize local dictators 
installed by Stalin’s policies.  De-Stalinization initially removed much of the fear Eastern 
Europeans felt in expressing their dissatisfaction with Soviet rapid industrialization and 
collectivization.   
The first challenge to the Soviet model of industrialization which impacted Soviet 
prestige was a labor revolt in Poznan, Poland in June 1956.  Tension eventually escalated 
into full scale violence and an armed insurrection against Polish government forces.133  
The unstable domestic situation opened the door for Wladyslaw Gomulka, a Polish 
reformer, to become the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party.  The situation 
worried Moscow so much that Khrushchev himself flew to Poland in October 1956 to 
personally respond to escalating tensions between Poles and their Soviet occupiers.  By 
the time Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet leadership had effectively 
acquiesced to Polish demands and removed the Soviet army general responsible for 
quelling peaceful protests with armed force.  Though Yugoslavia’s defection from the 
Soviet camp introduced the concept of “different roads to socialism” in 1948, this was the 
first time Soviet leadership begrudgingly accepted it as a legitimate policy.134   
This event alone did not signal Soviet regression from the fifth to the fourth tier of 
the hierarchy.  Further events created more cracks in Soviet external prestige, yet 
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acquiescence in the Poznan revolt was a major blow to Soviet international leadership 
and represents the first crack in the veneer of Soviet invincibility and prestige.  It was the 
loss of prestige endured during this event that prompted the Soviets to take more decisive 
action when confronted with a similar crisis in Hungary.   
The second event impacting Soviet external prestige and closely related to the 
Polish crisis was the Hungarian uprising of 1956.  According to the United Nations 
inquiry into the uprising, the direct cause of the crisis was the admission of crimes and 
atrocities made by the Hungarian Communist government against its political opponents.  
The revelations were part of Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization and demonstrated 
the measures Communist leaders implemented to silence political rivals in the years 
following World War II.135  Protests, riots, and demonstrations condemning the behavior 
of the Communist government escalated throughout the summer and fall of 1956 and 
resulted in the fall of three successive Hungarian governments and nation-wide violence.  
Finally on October 24th and again on November 4th, the Soviet Red Army employed 
infantry and armor units against the Hungarian people for the “re-conquest and military 
subjugation of Hungary.”136   
This event marks regression of the Soviet Union from a fifth tier strong state 
identity to an identity where fourth tier prestige needs became prepotent.  Soviet behavior 
resulted from a loss of prestige suffered during the previous Polish crisis.  The situation 
in Hungary was quickly spinning out of control and the Soviets were unwilling to allow 
another defection from their sphere of influence.  Thus, in much the same way Athens 
dealt with Melos to safeguard its prestige, the Soviets implemented force against the 
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After…recognition of “different roads to socialism,” the East European 
empire still remained fragile because it now depended on the willing 
collaboration of the local populations; yet they accorded this only because 
they feared Moscow’s reprisals if they did not—a situation that could last 
only so long as Moscow retained the capacity to compel collaboration.137   
Soviet imperialism extended beyond just territorial control; the Soviets attempted 
to control the realm of ideas as well.  Since Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform 
in 1948 over its divergent path towards full socialism, the Soviets sought to safeguard 
their prestige and position as leader of the Eastern Bloc.  Yet, it was not until de-
Stalinization in 1956 that a major rift opened up between Communism’s two strongest 
and most prestigious states.   
The Sino-Soviet rift created two centers of gravity in the Communist world.  The 
rift had long term consequences on Soviet leadership in the Eastern Bloc and its prestige 
around the world.  Scholars do not trace the origins of the rift to any specific date, but 
many agree that Khrushchev’s 1956 speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and the 
subsequent policy of de-Stalinization were seminal events in the deteriorating relations 
between the two states.138   
The Sino-Soviet rift beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1960s 
extended beyond philosophical debates on the advancement of Communism.  It resulted 
in actual armed conflict along the mutual Chinese-Soviet border in the Far East.  By 
March 1969, the dispute over recognized borders escalated to the point where armed 
conflict broke out between the two states over the disputed Zhenbao/Damansky 
islands.139  As a result of the violence, China became convinced that the Soviet Union 
posed an even bigger threat to their security than that posed by the U.S.140  This  
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development allowed the U.S. to exploit the rift and drive a wedge deeper between the 
world’s two largest Communist powers.141  The rift shattered the image of a unitary 
Communist bloc leading the world towards a peaceful Socialist utopia.   
These events demonstrate a loss of external prestige and mark the regression of 
the Soviet Union from a strong state identity to a state seeking to satisfy its fourth tier 
prestige needs.  From the beginning of Soviet regression down the hierarchy in 1956, 
much of the world began to the see the Soviet Union in a new light.  China and 
Yugoslavia presented alternative paths towards socialism.  Additionally, the events of the 
mid 1950s began to paint a picture of Eastern European discontent with the occupation of 
a foreign invader.  Europeans no longer saw the Soviets as noble liberators of Nazi 
tyranny, but began to see them as merely Russian aggressors seeking to extend the 
reaches of a bygone empire.  With severe blows to its external prestige, the Soviets began 
to reassess their policies.   
Challenges to Soviet authority continued to mount throughout the 1960s and 
1970s.  Reflecting the loss of prestige from these events, the Soviets redefined their 
concept of counterrevolution in 1968 and “…identified a threat to traditional socialist 
norms anywhere in the bloc as a menace to its prestige and stability.”142  As a result, the 
Soviets adopted what the West later dubbed as the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited 
sovereignty.   
The Brezhnev Doctrine subordinated Eastern European state sovereignty to the 
concept of international interventionism and justified the invasion of any Eastern Bloc 
state to prevent deviation away from Soviet established norms of behavior.143  It 
stemmed from a desire to prevent further defections from its camp and reverse the decline 
in its external prestige.  This policy guided Soviet behavior for at least the next ten years.         
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The Brezhnev Doctrine became the foundation of Soviet foreign policy for the 
next decade and provided some unfortunate predictability in their behavior.  The Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia was the first demonstrated behavior under this new policy.  
Though not carried out, the threat of Soviet invasion in 1980 hung over the heads of 
Poland’s leaders and provided them an incentive to initiate martial law to control 
prodemocracy demonstrations.144  In 1979, the invasion of Afghanistan became the first 
use of the Brezhnev Doctrine to justify the invasion of a non-Warsaw Pact state.  In much 
the same way Athens sought to maintain its external prestige through brutality (i.e., 
negative prestige), the Soviets implemented the Brezhnev Doctrine.  Yet, its behavior 
only facilitated the slow erosion of Soviet external prestige over time.  Two main events 
began to erode Soviet internal prestige. 
The first event to damage Soviet internal prestige was the signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act in 1975.  The Helsinki Final Act proved to be a historic change for many 
dissidents inside the Soviet Union.  The Soviets initially saw the Helsinki Final Act as an 
enhancement for its external prestige, for the Soviets saw the agreement as a 
legitimatization of post World War II borders and of Soviet satellites throughout Eastern 
Europe.  Rather than enhancing Soviet external prestige, it became one of the main 
instruments that lowered its internal prestige.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
says that the Helsinki Final Act was the:  
…spark that kindled widespread resistance to communist authority and the 
organization of numerous independent groups throughout Eastern Europe 
and even in the Soviet Union determined to bring change.145   
At the end of his life in 1982, Brezhnev had left the Soviet Union in decline and 
regressing down the hierarchy of needs.  The Soviet Union suffering from a loss of 
prestige had done little to stem the tide since 1956.  Its invasion of Afghanistan and 
suppression of Polish prodemocracy groups only succeeded in diminishing its external 
prestige further.  Meanwhile, dissidents within the Soviet Union used the Helsinki Final 
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Act to whittle away at Soviet internal prestige.  Yet, these events merely demonstrate the 
stagnation of the Soviet Union at the fourth tier of the hierarchy.  The advent of economic 
problems marks its regression further down the hierarchy. 
3. Regression from the Fourth Tier to the Third  
The third tier of the hierarchy addresses states’ need for external security.  The 
state seeks to protect its population from demonstrated or threatened outside aggression.  
Additionally, the state attempts to create a stable economic environment for its 
population.  It is in this regard that the Soviet Union began to regress to the third tier on 








































Figure 5.   Soviet Regression from Fourth to Third Tier 
Economic decline was the first indication of Soviet regression to the third tier of 
the hierarchy.  During the Soviet economic boom of the 1930s, grain exports became a 
primary means for financing Western imports.  By the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union had 
gone from the world’s largest grain exporter to its largest importer.146  As a result, the 
Soviets became increasingly dependent on not only foreign sources of grain, but 
particularly on American supplied grain.  Consequently, President Carter employed the  
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U.S. grain embargo of 1980 essentially as a “food weapon” against the Soviets in 
retaliation for their invasion of Afghanistan.147  Interestingly, the embargo exposed 
economic vulnerabilities in the Soviet’s security posture.   
This one facet of the Soviet economy was emblematic of the deterioration and 
decline throughout its entire economic system.  In fact, the Soviet economy experienced 
smaller growth in every year between 1971 and 1985 and had fallen technologically 
behind the West by eight to twelve years.148  President Reagan exploited this 
development to its full capacity.   
Recognizing Soviet economic vulnerabilities, the U.S. continued to up the ante on 
the Soviets.  First, President Reagan embarked on a massive U.S. defense buildup.  The 
increase in U.S. fielded forces and deployment of advanced weapons systems forced the 
Soviets to expend limited resources in an effort to keep parity with the U.S..  Secondly, 
Reagan sought to deprive the Soviets of crucial income from the sale of oil on the 
worldwide market.  The U.S. restricted the export of vital technologies the Soviets 
needed to extract their domestic oil, and it coordinated with Saudi Arabia to keep 
international oil production high so the price per barrel would remain low.149  The 
coordinated U.S. policy exacerbated preexisting Soviet economic vulnerabilities resulting 
in its regression to third tier external security needs.  Malia summarizes this development 
by commenting: 
…Reagan in his first term had become a figure of mythic aggressiveness 
to the Soviets.  After the soothing practices of detente, Moscow was 
confronted with an unprecedented American military buildup that 
culminated in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983 and was 
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say that under Andropov many in the Soviet leadership believed the 
United States actually sought war, a belief that reinforced all of the old 
doctrines about imperialism.150    
It was during this period of Soviet regression to third tier external security needs 
that Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985.  Gorbachev, 
deeply concerned about Soviet economic insecurity and international prestige, understood 
the need for change.  In fact, he confided to his friend and colleague Edvard 
Shevardnadze, “Everything is rotten…it’s no longer possible to live this way.” 151 
Gorbachev, while working for his patron, Yuri Andropov, became acquainted with 
economic reforms recommended by the 1983 Novosibirsk Report.  The report predicted a 
Soviet economic crisis within ten years unless the government enacted structural reforms, 
especially to its agricultural sector.152   
Consequently, the Soviet Union undertook a threefold plan to satisfy its third tier 
needs and renew its economy.  First, the Soviet leadership called for glasnost (i.e., 
publicity) to initiate public discussion of Soviet economic problems of stagnation.  
Secondly, officials intended open discussion of the state’s problems to ignite public 
support for economic reforms and stimulate innovation.  Thirdly and most observable by 
the West, the Soviet Union sought retrenchment of its overseas commitments to recoup 
needed capital for economic reform.153 
The Soviet Union began to look for ways to reapportion limited resources away 
from foreign commitments and back towards economic reform.  In order to reduce 
military spending, the Soviets had to end the arms race with the United States.  Initially, 
this meant a halt in the deployment of SS-20 intermediate range missiles.154  Later, it 
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meant the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan.155  With these decisions, 
the Soviet Union began to disengage from the Cold War unilaterally and adopt behaviors 
to satisfy its third tier external security needs.  
Additionally, the Soviet Union chose not to reassert its authority in August 1989 
when Hungary opened up its border to Austria.  East Germans followed suit nearly three 
months later and opened their borders to the West effectively ending forty-five years of 
Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.  This paved the way for the removal of Soviet 
forces from Eastern Europe including over 546,000 troops from Germany alone.156  By 
1990, retrenchment had erased all of the overseas commitments initiated during the 
Brezhnev era saving the Soviet Union billions of dollars in expenditures.   
In the course of five years, the Soviet Union changed the apportionment of its 
resources away from foreign policy towards domestic reform.  The Soviet Union greatly 
reduced its expenditures needed to supply this vast worldwide empire.  The Soviets 
recouped an estimated $43.2 billion per year spent to maintain its Eastern European 
satellites.157  The Soviets hoped retrenching these commitments would relieve pressure 
on its economy and give the state breathing room vital for carrying out other domestic 
reforms.   
Though Soviet external security needs appeared capable of withstanding the loss 
of the Eastern European buffer zone, the USSR was not prepared to withstand the rapid 
pace of German reunification and the potential resurgence of a dominant Germany in the 
middle of Europe.  Many in the Soviet Union feared a revanchist Germany after 
reunification, which exacerbated unmet third tier needs exposed by economic 
instability.158    
 
155 Michael Dobbs, “Oil's Skid Fuels Gorbachev's Reforms: Lagging Output in Siberia Stirs Soviet 
Economic Reappraisal Series,” Washington Post, sec. Russia-Economy Series Number: 1/2, May 28, 1990, 
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 27, 2008). 
156 Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 164. 
157 Estimate reflects the year 1981. Dobbs, Oil's Skid Fuels Gorbachev's Reforms: Lagging Output in 
Siberia Stirs Soviet Economic Reappraisal Series. 
158 Fredo Arias-King, “Gorbachev Steered Things in a Constructive Way,” Demokratizatsiya 13, no. 2 
(April 1, 2005): 286, www.proquest.com (accessed December 15, 2008). 
 63
                                                
Conservatives saw the loss of the Soviet Union’s Eastern European client states as 
betraying the worldwide socialist revolution, and feared its impact on Soviet security.  
Yegor Ligachev, de facto leader of the conservative faction in the Kremlin, specifically 
expressed this concern and accused some “new thinkers” as selling out their comrades in 
Eastern Europe.159  The Soviet Union had very real security concerns with a newly 
unified Germany becoming a member in NATO.  Colonel General Nikolay Chervov 
summarized this viewpoint when he wrote,  
…a united Germany in NATO would be definitely unacceptable…It 
would seriously upset the military balance of strength that has developed 
in Europe.160  
The external security needs represented by the statements above became very 
sharp for many in the Soviet Union.  More importantly, the statements above reflect a 
serious rift forming between camps in the ruling elite.  The rifts eventually became wide 
enough to endanger domestic stability of the state itself. 
3. Regression from the Third Tier to the Second 
States on the second tier of the hierarchy seek to maintain their internal security.  
As the state holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a specific boundary, it 
must eliminate any challenges to its monopoly.  Thus, the loss of the Soviet Union’s 
Eastern European satellites, and especially the creation of a unified Germany within 
NATO, exposed numerous rifts within Soviet society.  These developments fomented 
several challenges to the Soviet Union’s political structure and eventually to its legitimate 
monopoly (Figure 6).   
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Figure 6.   Regression from Third to Second Tier 
Three factors contributed to the ultimate regression of the Soviet Union down to 
second tier internal security needs.  It began with the political rift that opened up between 
reformers and conservatives over loss of the Soviet worldwide empire.  Gorbachev’s 
creation of parallel institutions and the direct election of government officials by the 
people exacerbated the rift caused by the Party’s loss of power and prestige.  While these 
internal political battles raged, the periphery was able to exploit the center’s weakness 
and began moving towards independence.   
The first rift to develop among Soviet elites was over Party privileges.  Glasnost 
exposed them to public criticisms for abuses committed over seventy years of Communist 
Party domination.  The nomenklatura (i.e., the inner Party elites controlling the outer 
Party rank and file) were the most resistant to reform since they had the most to lose.  
This set conservative elements of the Party seeking to maintain the status quo against 
those who attempted to reform it.   
The fight for supremacy between reformers and conservatives eventually resulted 
in the creation of new governmental institutions.  In March 1989, the Soviet Union held 
its first semi-competitive elections in almost seventy years to elect members to the new 
Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD).  The CPD was an elective body that ran parallel to 
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Communist Party institutions and sought to maneuver around the largesse of the Party.161  
The election ended the Communist Party’s stranglehold on state policy and made it 
compete with reform communists as well as non-communists in the market place of 
ideas.  The historic election paved the way for the direct election of Boris Yeltsin as the 
chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990 making him the most trusted politician 
in the country.  His reforms and popularity soon presented a direct challenge to the 
established Soviet leadership.162  As infighting among conservatives and reformers 
whittled away at Soviet domestic security from the inside, nationalism chipped away at it 
from periphery. 
The second rift responsible for the regression of the Soviet Union to second tier of 
the hierarchy was the desire of Soviet republics on the periphery to gain more autonomy 
from the Soviet national leadership.  Liberation of Eastern European states provoked a 
similar desire of the three Baltic republics to gain autonomy from Moscow.  Baltic 
nationalists began demanding details on the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact of 1939 from the Soviet government.163  Consequently, Baltic calls for independence 
spread to other republics of the Soviet Union as well.  By 1990, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Armenia all sought independence from the Soviet center.   
By 1991, Yeltsin had begun to foment ethnic Russian nationalism in the small 
ruling elite of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian SFSR).  His 
intent was to undermine the authority of the Soviet Union, and thus, undermine 
Gorbachev’s authority.164  With these actions, Yeltsin’s Russian nationalism effectively 
ended ethnic Russian support for maintaining the Soviet Empire.  Russia was the largest 
of the republics with a preponderance of the natural and human resources.  Once the  
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Russian SFSR lost enthusiasm for maintaining the Soviet grip on the periphery, it was 
inevitable for the Baltic Republics and the rest of the periphery to break away, and thus, 
end the viability of the Soviet state and its ruling elite.165   
As a result of these events and subsequent regression to the second tier of the 
hierarchy, Soviet behavior became predictable.  National leaders once unwilling to use 
violence against their Eastern European satellites now embraced violence to mitigate 
increasing threats to its internal security.  Several examples demonstrate the Soviet 
leadership’s embrace of violence.   
By 1990, Moscow had firmly embraced the use of violence against Soviet 
republics on the periphery to reassert its authority and maintain its monopoly on the use 
of force.  Moscow authorized the KGB, military and police forces to use violence in the 
Baltic Republics as well as in Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia.  Some of Moscow’s 
actions were simply to quell pro-independence demonstrations while others specifically 
tried to remove locally elected leaders and replace them with puppet regimes.    
One such episode took place in Lithuania.  In January 1991, riot police and 
elements of the KGB attempted to remove the elected government of Lithuania and 
replace it with puppet regime.  During this operation, Soviet forces killed over a dozen 
people and drew widespread criticism for its behavior from around the world.166  Similar 
violence took place across the Soviet periphery as the center attempted to mitigate threats 
to its authority and safeguard the integrity of the Soviet state itself.  These events set the 
stage for further regression down the hierarchy of needs. 
4. Regression from the Second Tier to the First  
States on the first tier of the hierarchy seek to satisfy needs of legitimacy.  Other 
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grant it internal legitimacy by conforming to its expected norms of behaviors.  By 1991, 
the Soviet Union still enjoyed external legitimacy; however, its internal legitimacy was 
dissolving at a rapid rate.   
By summer 1991, six of the Soviet Union’s fifteen republics either sought 
autonomy within a loose confederation or outright independence from Moscow.  In fact, 
the Soviet Union’s largest and most influential republic (i.e., Russian SFSR) sought 
independence from the national leadership and began making bilateral agreements with 
other Soviet republics claiming sovereignty.167  This predicament destabilized the regime 
to the point where only one of two things would happen.  The regime would implode 
under the pressures exerted upon it and cease to exist, or conservative factions within the 
government would use force to reestablish a hold on power and secure the state’s internal 
legitimacy.  Both of these options transpired in the final days of the Soviet Union.   
The defections of the constituent republics forced the Soviet leadership to 
renegotiate the distribution of state power with the remaining nine republics, which had 
not declared their intention to secede from the union168.  The Nine plus One Treaty was 
an attempt to save the Soviet Union in any form.  This was the impetus resulting in a 
conservative coup attempting to scuttle the new union treaty and retain the union in its 
original form.  The failed conservative coup against Gorbachev and other reformers in 
August 1991 was a behavior attempting to satisfy first tier legitimacy needs.  Since the 
regime was unable or simply unwilling to reassert its control on the periphery, the regime 
turned on itself.  The abortive coup ultimately hastened the dissolution of the union itself.   
By December 1991, twelve constituent republics voted to dissolve the Soviet 
Union and form a loose confederation of independent states.  The three Baltic Republics 
opted for full independence without participating in the confederation.  After its 
dissolution, the newly independent Russian Federation became the successor state to the 
Soviet Union.169  Boris Yeltsin became the first president of this new state and inherited 
 
167 Tuminez, “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union - x5:4,” 127. 
168 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, 483. 
169 Ibid., 489. 
 68
many of the resources left behind from the Soviet Union.  He also inherited many of its 
problems, which continued to stagnate the new Russian Federation at the bottom of the 
hierarchy.  
B. RUSSIA’S PROGRESSION UP THE HIERARCHY  
1. Introduction 
The Russian Federation faced numerous challenges forming a new state in place 
of the Soviet Union.  Though dominant in the old union, the Russian Federation had to 
develop an independent identity from that of the discredited Soviet state.  The process of 
forming an independent identity did not occur overnight and led to the stagnation of the 
Russian Federation at the bottom of the hierarchy for several years.  It had to answer 
fundamental questions regarding the nature of the new state itself.  Which territories of 
the former Soviet Union would gain sovereignty, and which would become constituent 
parts of other newly formed states?  Would the Russian Federation adopt a true 
democratic government?  If so, which model would a new Russian executive branch 
follow?  To what degree would the Russians abandon the communist ideology, and how 
would Russia make the transition between the old and the new?  Many of these questions 
plaguing Russia in January 1992 went unanswered until 2004 when Vladimir Putin began 
his second term as Russian Federation President.  It was at this time that the Russian 
Federation sufficiently satisfied its lower level needs and was well on its way back up the 
hierarchy.  To understand this assertion fully, it is necessary to examine Russian 
Federation stagnation at the lower levels of the hierarchy.    
2.  Stagnation at the Hierarchy’s Lower Levels 
The new Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin, and his reformers had to 
create a state and its institutions from scratch.  They had to completely change Russia’s 
economic system, form of government, and create a new political culture.  Each of these 
was a monumental task requiring great political skill and an abundance of public support; 
however, Yeltsin did not command universal support.  Just as violence accompanied the 
regression of the Soviet Union down the hierarchy, the dissolution of the union did not 
sufficiently satisfy Russia’s lower level needs or stem the tide of violence.  Russia had to 
establish its legitimacy before progressing back up the hierarchy and would have to 
resolve two situations before gaining legitimacy and beginning its journey back up the 
hierarchy.  
The Russian Federation’s primary obstacle to progressing up the hierarchy was 
establishing its internal legitimacy; conversely, external legitimacy did not prove much of 
a problem for Russia.  Before the official demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 
the U.S. and many other states in the international system recognized the Russian 
Federation as the successor state to the Soviet Union.170  In fact, Russian assumption of 
Soviet treaty responsibilities and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council codified this status by early 1992.171  Attaining internal legitimacy, however, 






































Figure 7.   Russian Stagnation at the Bottom of the Hierarchy 
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After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation struggled with 
creating a new state identity.  The Soviet Union did not disintegrate as a result of military 
loss on the battlefield.  The state simply turned on itself and fell apart at the seams.  As a 
result, the Russian Federation had to solve two problems related to legitimacy.  First, it 
had to establish a government that Russian citizens would accept as legitimate.  
Secondly, it had to delineate the geographic boundaries of the state itself and define the 
relationship between the state’s center and its hinterlands.172   
With regards to the first task, several different factions broke out along 
ideological lines and sought dominance over the others.  Communists seeking to 
reconstitute the union allied with ultranationalist Russians and vied for power against 
Western leaning liberals.173  Each camp splintered further with ultraliberals devotionally 
supportive of President Yeltsin while other liberals of the intelligentsia criticized him at 
every turn.  Unlike opposition parties in Central Europe, which divided along 
socioeconomic lines, Russian opposition forces coalesced around the issue of Russian 
lost superpower status.174   
The resulting power struggles between Russian factions impeded basic state 
making decisions.  The state flailed as different factions attempted to shape the Russian 
constitution, transition to market economy, and the tenor and orientation of Russia’s 
relations with the outside world.  The factions involved were less interested in creating 
lasting institutions and more interested in enhancing their personal powerbases.  As a 
result, governance of the state relied on specific personalities, such as President Yeltsin 
or his nemesis Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov, and not on designated roles of 
state institutions.  This situation kept the Russian Federation stagnant at first tier 
legitimacy needs and set the stage for increased violence during Yeltsin’s first term.  
Russia also faced other issues regarding its legitimacy. 
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The Russian Federation faced questions concerning the composition of the state 
itself.  In 1991, the de facto standard used to divide the Soviet Union into independent 
states was releasing its fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) for full self-
determination.  Thirty-eight Autonomous Socialist Republics (ASSR) throughout the 
Soviet Union and over eighty-six other smaller autonomous entities alone in the newly 
created Russian Federation simply remained constituent parts of their larger parent 
SSRs.175  This was troubling to many nationalities within the Russian Federation, which 
became part of the fledgling state without much say in the matter.  Chechnya was one 
such area where the population did not favor the method used to delineate independent 
states.  Interestingly, Yeltsin had advised the Russian regions of Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan in August 1990 to “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” in an 
attempt to undermine Gorbachev’s authority and loosen his grip on the Soviet 
periphery.176  These words soon came back to haunt Yeltsin as he attempted to establish 
the state’s internal legitimacy and maintain its territorial integrity after gaining 
independence in December 1991.   
At the same time the Baltic Republics were pressuring Gorbachev for 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, the Checheno-Ingush ASSR of the Russian 
socialist republic pushed for similar demands.  In fact, Chechnya proclaimed its 
autonomy from the Soviet Union on November 27, 1990 and went as far as claiming 
complete independence from the Russian SFSR by July 1991.177  Consequently, Chechen 
behavior resulted in Russian declaration of a state of emergency.  In spite of this 
declaration, the August 1991 coup, Yeltsin’s continued rivalry with Gorbachev, and a 
host of other problems soon put Chechnya at the bottom of Russia’s list of crises.178  By 
the time Yeltsin became the president of the independent state known as the Russian 
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Federation in December 1991, Chechnya had declared its complete independence, elected 
a new president and parliament, and mobilized all able-bodied men to defend the new 
state.179    
The territorial integrity of the newly created Russian Federation was at stake.  A 
modern interpretation of the “domino theory” confronted Russia’s leaders in the early 
part of 1992.180  They feared the eventual disintegration of the state if they allowed 
Chechnya to pursue its independence.  The resource rich regions of Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, Tyva, and North Ossetia all sought independence and observed Moscow’s 
response closely.  In fact, “broad regional coalitions,” such as a Caucasus Confederation, 
Volga-Urals Confederation, Finno-Ugric movement, Far East union, and a Siberian 
Agreement, had emerged in opposition to Moscow’s authority.181   
Additionally, the internal strife between the Federation’s branches of government 
exacerbated Russia’s tensions on its periphery.  The longer Russia’s constitutional issues 
remained unresolved, the longer Russia’s territorial integrity remained in jeopardy.  As a 
result, Russia initiated several behaviors to satisfy its first tier needs of legitimacy.      
The Russian government had squandered almost two years since the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and had failed to create a government with universal internal 
legitimacy.182  The regime’s subsequent behavior came as no surprise.  After months of 
infighting, the executive branch declared direct presidential rule and dissolved the 
legislative branch in September 1993.  Ten days of conflict and the shelling of the 
Russian parliament building known as the White House resulted from the decision of 
direct presidential rule.183  It led to a violent showdown between the executive and 
legislative branches of government with each vying for power over the other.  Though the  
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executive branch eventually succeeded in asserting its dominance over the legislative, 
resolution of the constitutional crisis did not solve all of Russia’s issues concerning its 
internal legitimacy. 
After resolving the constitutional crisis in October 1993, Moscow turned its 
attention on consolidating its control over the Russian periphery.  One of its first steps 
was to sign a bilateral treaty with Tatarstan in February 1994, which defined the limits of 
Tatar autonomy within the political structure of the Russian Federation.  Moscow desired 
a similar resolution in its conflict with Chechnya; however, Chechen President Dzhokhar 
Dudayev was unwilling to entertain any arrangement short of full independence from 
Russia.  Therefore, Moscow chose to send in Russian Federal troops in December 1994 
for what it hoped would be a quick war.  Russian leadership became convinced that 
Russian supported opposition groups in Chechnya had adequately weakened Dudayev’s 
government making a quick victory possible.184  Though Russian leadership did not 
intend to enter into a protracted quagmire in Chechnya, its invasion did accomplish two 
primary goals, which helped to satisfy its first tier internal legitimacy needs successfully. 
Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation demonstrated its willingness to 
defend its own existence.  The executive branch’s use of force against the legislative 
branch allowed it to consolidate a political structure fully.  The implementation of a new 
constitution and the resolution of the October constitutional crisis allowed Moscow to 
focus on defending Russian territorial integrity.  Though a 1996 armistice with Chechnya 
was not the preferred outcome from the Kremlin’s point of view, successful treaties with 
Tatarstan, Chechnya, and its other republics concluded Russia’s internal fight for 
legitimacy. 
3. Progression from the First Tier to the Second  
Russia had adequately satisfied its first tier needs by establishing its internal 
legitimacy.  In 1996, it began to transition from the first tier to the second tier of the 
hierarchy.  It had demonstrated its desire to defend its own existence; however, it still 
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retained a relatively weak state identity.  It had to progress back up a significant portion 
of the hierarchy before it could approach the strong state identity it had in the years 
following its World War II victory.  However, lawlessness and terrorism were two 
phenomena primarily responsible for preventing Russia from satisfying its second tier 



































Figure 8.   Progression from First to Second Tier 
Observers of Russian politics during the 1990s used several different analogies to 
describe Russia’s economic and political climate during that time.  Some used the 
American Wild West as an appropriate metaphor while others used references to Al 
Capone or U.S. Robber Barons of the nineteenth century to describe Russia after the fall 
of the Soviet Union.185  Each of the metaphors comments on the nexus of 
entrepreneurship and political influence and its impact on Russian domestic security. 
Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union failed to create lasting political 
institutions.  The result was the increasing personalization of Russian politics where 
one’s proximity to the President became the primary factor for succeeding in business 
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and politics.186  The oligarchs epitomized this phenomenon.  They were Russia’s six 
wealthiest entrepreneurs who controlled a majority of Russia’s natural resources.  They 
considered themselves the puppeteers of the Russian executive branch ensuring amenable 
government policy to their personal business interests.187  The public increasingly lost 
confidence in Yeltsin’s ability to create a true democratic government and saw the 
government existing to help its friends in business and not the Russian people.  In fact, 
the media and the public began to refer to some of the oligarchs as modern-day 
Rasputins, a reference to the monk who helped bring down the Russian Empire in 
1917.188  While the oligarchs eroded the public’s confidence in the government, 
organized crime also did much to impact Russian domestic security.   
The Soviet Union did experience crime throughout its history albeit at much 
lower levels than western states.  Most criminal acts centered on hooliganism, corruption, 
and robbery though criminals never gained the upper hand on Russian law 
enforcement.189  However, the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a “criminal revolution” 
in the Russian Federation with crimes such as kidnapping, drug smuggling, murder, and 
software piracy occurring at levels never seen before.190  Organized groups were 
responsible for the largest increase in crime accounting for over twenty-six thousand 
offenses in 1996 when compared to only thirty-five hundred in 1990.  In fact, the 
influence of organized crime had grown so much in Russia that a 1997 U.S. 
Congressional report warned that Russia was quickly becoming an “ungovernable and 
mafia-dominated nuclear superpower.”191  Stephen White describes the situation as 
follows:  
Russia was also distinctive in the extent to which organised crime – 
loosely described as the ‘the mafia’ – had permeated every pore of 
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entrepreneurship and trade and was dominating both legitimate and 
illegitimate economic sectors simultaneously including half the banks and 
80 percent of joint ventures with foreign capital, and perhaps 40 percent of 
the economy as a whole…192 
Also contributing to Russian stagnation at tier two domestic security needs was 
the increasing specter of terrorism.  The 1996 armistice between the Russian Federation 
and Chechnya left the matter largely unresolved.  Neither side had scored a complete 
victory over the other.  Chechen separatist increasingly saw terrorism as a means of 
leverage to gain their complete independence from Moscow.  Chechen militants launched 
several large scale terrorist operations in Russian cities throughout the 1990s.  In June 
1995, a Chechen warlord named Shamil Basayev took fifteen hundred Russians hostage 
in a hospital in the town of Budyonnovsk resulting in the deaths of one hundred sixty-six 
people.  In January 1996, Chechen militants took two thousand people hostage in the 
Dagestani city of Kizlyar resulting in the deaths of between fifty and one hundred 
hostages and townspeople.193  Though minor bombings took place throughout the 
federation, it was two bombings of Moscow apartment buildings in 1999 that shook 
public confidence in the government’s ability to protect them.194  
The ultimate effect of these phenomena left Russia stagnating at tier two domestic 
security needs.  Subsequent Russian behavior attempted to increase state power in order 
to decrease rampant chaos experienced throughout the country and increase public 
confidence in the state’s ability to protect them.  The first challenge tackled by the 
Russian government was stemming the tide of terrorism originating from Chechnya.   
In October 1999, just weeks after becoming Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin launched a new war with Chechnya describing it as 
“operations to suppress terrorism.”195  Unfortunately for the Russian Federation, terrorist 
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attacks actually increased in ferocity from 1999 through 2005.  Though officially 
declaring combat operations over in April 2002, Vladimir Putin ultimately succeeded in 
stemming the tide of Chechen terrorism with a policy of Chechenization of the conflict.  
By 2006, he had propped up Ramzan Kadyrov, a former rebel turned Moscow loyalist, as 
the President of Chechnya and essentially gave him carte blanche in suppressing Chechen 
separatism and terrorism.196  Additionally, Russian Federal forces by 2006 had killed 
Shamil Basayev, the alleged mastermind of several high profile terrorist acts.197  These 
behaviors began to stem the tide of terrorism inside the Russian Federation and marked a 
starting point for satisfying its domestic security needs.  However, its success against 
terrorism did not fully satisfy Russian domestic security needs.   
The state still had to consolidate its strength at expense of the oligarchs and 
organized crime before it sufficiently satisfied its second tier domestic security needs.  
One of the first behaviors initiated to achieve this goal was the re-emphasis on tax 
collection after Russia’s financial crisis of 1998.198  At that time, Russia began to target 
its rich and famous for tax evasion largely as a means to intimidate ordinary citizens into 
paying their taxes.199  The policy had the added benefit of asserting the government’s 
dominance over Russia’s oligarchs as well.  One by one, the oligarchs began to lose their 
power.  Some, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, went to federal prison for tax evasion 
while others, such as Boris Berezovsky, chose self-initiated exile abroad.  The oligarchs 
who remained willingly submitted to the authority of the state in deference to its ruling 
elite.  The state took additional measures to consolidate its power and decrease the level 
of societal chaos present since the 1990s.   
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Shortly after Putin’s inauguration in 2000, Russia initiated reforms in its federal 
structure.  In the 1990s, Russia had direct popular elections of its regional governors.  
This federal structure enabled the governors to create a separate power base and ignore 
the mandates of the national government in Moscow.  Some regions went as far as to 
declare autonomy from Moscow and negotiate their own international treaties.200  The 
regions were rife with corruption, which facilitated much of the existing crime.  The 
state’s initial attempt at reform in 2000 ejected regional governors from the Federal 
Council (i.e., the upper house of Parliament) and appointed national “super governors” to 
provide oversight of the regions.201  In 2004, the state went further and implemented 
direct presidential appointments of all regional governors with approval of the regional 
legislatures.  With this move, the national government brought the governors to heel and 
removed any source of their independent power base making them reliant on Moscow for 
support.  The result of these reforms brought the regions into compliance with national 
norms of behavior and facilitated the collection of taxes that flowed into the coffers of the 
national government.202   
After the adoption of these behaviors, Russia successfully satisfied its second tier 
domestic security needs.  It had sufficiently quelled threats of separatism and terrorism 
from Chechen rebels with a policy of Chechenization.  Additionally, Russia had 
consolidated state power through the collection of taxes.  This policy reduced the 
influence of the oligarchs and regional governors and further stabilized the country with 
the imposition of standardized norms throughout the country.  Russian ruling elites in 
February 2006 expressed their new found confidence with the term “sovereign 
democracy.”  Masha Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center explains two meanings the 
term conveys.  The term and its two meanings mark Russia’s transition from a domestic 
focus to a focus on its external security and its relations with other states. 
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“Sovereign democracy” is a Kremlin coinage that conveys two messages: 
first, that Russia's regime is democratic and, second, that this claim must 
be accepted, period. Any attempt at verification will be regarded as 
unfriendly and as meddling in Russia's domestic affairs.203                
4. Progression from the Second Tier to the Third 
Though external security was extremely important to Russia since its birth as a 
sovereign state in 1991, establishing its legitimacy and domestic security had preoccupied 
Russian leaders for its first fifteen years of existence.  By 2006, Russia was ready to 
concentrate on its relations with others states in the international system and its own 
external security needs.  At the forefront of Russia’s external security needs is its 
influence in what it calls the “Near Abroad” or those independent states previously part 
of the Soviet Union.  Russia sees two primary competitors for influence in its near 
abroad, which produces two different types of Russian responses.  First, Russia has an 
interest in monitoring growing Chinese influence in Central Asia, and secondly, it is 








































Figure 9.   Russian Progression from Second to Third Tier 
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The Russian Federation has increasingly adopted an Eastern orientation in its 
foreign policy since 2006.204  This shift is in stark contrast to Gorbachev, who aligned 
Soviet foreign policy with the West and Western values of political liberalism.  Russia’s 
orientation toward the east stems from three primary interests.   
First, Russia has had a long and enduring interest in Central Asia.  This 
relationship began as early as 1716 when Peter the Great attempted to conquer the 
Khanate of Khiva in modern day Uzbekistan.  By the late nineteenth century, Alexander 
III had conquered much of the region formally making the area part of the Russian 
Empire.  Stalin and Lenin incorporated the region into the Soviet Union as early as 1918 
after the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian Provisional Government.  As a result, 
millions of ethnic Russians migrated to the region over the years.  Though many of them 
have returned to Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, approximately 5.5 
million ethnic Russians live in the region today as ethnic minorities.205  The Russia 
Federation has expressed interest in the welfare and status of these Russian minorities 
within the five former Soviet Republics in Central Asia.206  Yet, Russia has other issues 
justifying its interest in Central Asia. 
Russia also has interest in decreasing the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and 
separatism in the region.  In a 2003 speech in Malaysia, former Russian President 
Vladimir Putin declared Russia a Muslim power.  His declaration reflects the changing 
demographics in Russia where Muslims constitute over ten percent of the Russian 
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partly to monitor entities potentially influencing its growing Muslim population.  While 
Muslim influence remains a valid interest for Russia, it is also concerned with growing 
Chinese expansion in the region.   
China has increasing economic incentives to expand its influence in Central Asia.  
China has become an international economic powerhouse over the years making it the 
second largest importer of oil behind the U.S..  Rapid Chinese economic growth results in 
a nine percent increase in Chinese annual oil consumption with much of it imported from 
unstable regions such as the Middle East.208  Yet, vast oil and natural gas reserves in the 
Caspian Sea region of Central Asia offers China a reliable source of energy to fuel its 
growing economy.209  Consequently, some Russians view the expansion of Chinese 
influence in the region with suspicion.   
Though they do not constitute a majority view in the Russian political elites, two 
primary factions advocate containment of growing Chinese influence in Central Asia.  
First, Russian “Westernizers” (e.g., Yegor Gaidar) want the state to embrace a Western 
oriented foreign policy while at the same time countering any potential Chinese threats to 
Russia’s Far East region.210  A second faction is the ultranationalists (e.g., Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky) who contend China is too Western oriented itself and an alliance with them 
subordinates Russian interests to a foreign power.211  Subsequent Russian behavior in 
Central Asia attempts to satisfy its external security needs while taking these factors into 
consideration. 
Russia’s behavioral response has been threefold.  First, it seeks to engage China 
and cooperate on issues of mutual interest in the Central Asian region.  Economic trade 
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and fighting terrorism are the most prominent issues of cooperation between the two 
states, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the primary vehicle to 
pursue these mutual interests.212  The SCO provides a framework for its six member 
states to coordinate antiterrorism polices and conduct periodic combined exercises to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of these policies.213  More importantly, the SCO provides a 
forum for its member states to conduct bilateral trade negotiations.214  As a result, 
Chinese-Russian trade has grown over the years and reached $43 billion in 2008.  Both 
states expect a fourteen percent increase in 2009 putting China in the top five of Russia’s 
trading partners.215  Yet, Russia also seeks to create mechanisms outside of its Chinese 
engagement policy that protect its Central Asian interests.   
Therefore, Russia has adopted a second response to protect its economic interests 
in Central Asia.  Russia is a member of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), 
which has the stated purpose of increasing coordination among its members for the 
production of gas resources throughout the world.216  Russia’s interests extend beyond 
simple coordination of these policies.  It is attempting to create a gas cartel similar to the 
Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) that unifies oil production policies of 
its member states for sale on the world oil market.217  In fact, it is particularly interested 
in creating a “gas troika” where Russia along with Iran and Qatar would control gas 
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policies for approximately two-thirds of the world’s gas reserves.218  Additionally, 
Russia is seeking greater control over non-Russian gas production through bilateral trade 
deals.  In 2008, Russia signed a twenty- year agreement to buy Turkmen gas at similar 
prices currently paid by Europeans.  Though Russia will not make much money in the 
deal, it does give Russia’s state owned gas company, Gazprom, control over 
Turkmenistan’s gas production.219  Similar agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
the other two gas producing states in Central Asia, would provide Moscow a strategic 
advantage over states currently reliant on Central Asian gas imports such as China and 
European states.220  While these actions protect its economic interests in Central Asia, 
Russia’s uses a different mechanism to ensure its security interests
Russia’s third and final behavioral response has been to strengthen the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  Whereas the SCO is a forum for coordinating 
both security and economic issues between Russia and states not previously part of the 
Soviet Union, the CSTO focuses specifically on security issues.  The organization stems 
from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and only comprises former 
republics of the Soviet Union though it has extended an invitation to Iran.221  Russia has 
increasingly attempted over the years to forge a much closer military relationship with 
CSTO members than it has with SCO members.222  In fact, the CSTO has created a 
permanent rapid reaction force for world-wide deployment.223  Additionally, Russia has 
provided advanced weapon systems to CSTO member states for domestic Russian 
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prices.224  This decision has led to significant integration of member state air defense 
forces, which “far surpasses the SCO’s activities in defense.”225  In fact, it is the CSTO 
that Russia sees as NATO’s equivalent and not the SCO.226  The statement below from 
President Medvedev’s official Kremlin website reinforces Moscow’s view of 
NATO/CSTO parity and demonstrates Russian concern over foreign influence in its Near 
Abroad.    
Noting the serious potential for conflict that is building up in close 
proximity to the CSTO’s zone of responsibility, the organisation’s 
member states call on the NATO countries to weigh up all possible 
consequences of NATO’s eastward expansion and the deployment of new 
missile defence system components.227   
Russia sees NATO member states, and specifically the U.S., as its other primary 
competitor.  It is deeply concerned over the West’s growing influence in Eastern 
European and the Caucasus.228  Russia has many of the same concerns in Eastern Europe 
and the Caucasus as it does in Central Asia.  Similarly, these include a longstanding 
relationship with Caucasians and Eastern Europeans, concern for 10.5 million ethnic 
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Russians living in the Near Abroad, securing Russia’s economic interests in the region, 
and monitoring regional instability potentially impacting Russia’s domestic 
populations.229  Yet, Russia sees a difference between the growing influences of its two 
competitors.   
The U.S. and NATO have done something that the Chinese have not so far.  
NATO has facilitated the departure of former Soviet republics from the sphere of Russian 
influence and formally incorporated them into Western security arrangements.  Russia 
now distrusts NATO and sees expansion into the Near Abroad as reneging on assurances 
given to Gorbachev during the fall of the Berlin Wall.230  The row over U.S. plans to 
install components of a missile defense system in the former Warsaw Pact states of 
Poland and the Czech Republic is emblematic of Russia’s general frustration over NATO 
expansion eastward.  It is this difference that resulted in changes in Russian foreign 
policy behavior.  Russia no longer focuses on engagement with NATO as it does with 
China but rather on competition with NATO.  Russia sees the realm of international 
relations in a zero-sum game where increased security for the West comes at its own 
expense.  Several examples illustrate Russia’s current policy of competition with NATO 
states. 
First, Russia is increasing the capability and use of its nuclear triad as a deterrent 
to further NATO expansion into the Near Abroad.  In the years before 2005, Russia’s 
Long Range Aviation (LRA) bomber force flew less than a dozen annual sorties outside 
of Russian controlled airspace.  Between August 2007 and May 2008, the number of 
similar missions had increased to over 150 with each provoking a fighter intercept from 
six Euro-Atlantic states and Japan.231  Russia’s LRA forces now routinely fly in close 
proximity to Japanese and NATO territory without straying from internationally 
recognized airspace.  Russian aircrews have performed missile drills while conducting 
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some of these missions.232  Additionally, Russia has allocated more of its resources to 
upgrading its nuclear triad.  It is fielding the Kh-102 advanced nuclear cruise missile that 
doubles the range of the AS-15/KENT.233  Russia also expects to field the BULAVA 
submarine-launched ballistic missile enabling it to defeat any proposed U.S. missile 
defense shield.234  Training and upgrading weapon systems of the nuclear triad is one 
way Russia demonstrates its competition with NATO; however, it is not the only method. 
Russia is playing tit for tat with the U.S. by creating its own sphere of influence in 
South America and the Caribbean.  This is in retaliation over increasing U.S. influence in 
Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Caucasus.  Russia is increasingly forging closer 
relationships with anti-U.S. regimes in the Western hemisphere such as Cuba and 
Venezuela.  For example, Russian officials are entertaining the idea of basing LRA 
bombers in Cuba while at the same time exporting $4.4 billion of advanced weaponry to 
Venezuela. 235  This is yet another way for Russia to exert pressure on the U.S. and to 
voice its displeasure over NATO expansion into its Near Abroad.  Russia has additional 
methods as well.   
Russian external security needs are most poignant with regards to the Caucasus.  
It is one thing for Eastern Europeans to leave Russia’s sphere of influence; however, it is 
quite a different matter for states of the Caucasus to leave.  Russia sees a very active role 
for itself in the Caucasus and is the self-proclaimed “…guarantor of security for peoples 
of the Caucasus.”236  The August 2008 conflict involving Georgia, its breakaway 
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russia demonstrate the extreme measures 
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Russia is willing to take in protecting its interests and satisfying its external security 
needs.237  The conflict resulted in the Russian occupation of disputed and undisputed 
Georgian territory and the unilateral recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
independence.  Some have argued that Russia’s action during the conflict was a direct 
challenge to NATO over its policy of eastward expansion.  Additionally, critics charge 
that Russia sought to “punish” the West for violence perpetrated against Serbia and 
subsequent recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.238  Other’s 
claim Russia initiated the conflict to gain control over non-Russia energy reserves.239  
This view highlights the final behavior Russia has adopted to satisfy its external security 
needs in its competition with the West.   
Russia uses energy as strategic leverage in its competition with the West.  It 
attempts to coerce European states into adopting favorable policy positions towards 
Russia.240  Failure to do so results in Russia’s suspension of energy supplies to the 
incompliant state.  It was a tactic first employed by Gorbachev in 1990 in an attempt to 
coerce compliance from the Baltic Republics over unilateral declarations of 
independence.241  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has 
periodically used the tactic as well.  A Pew Research polls indicates that European 
citizens are growing more concerned over Russia’s use of “energy blackmail.”242  Even 
observers who acknowledge the legitimate business practices behind Russian decisions 
concerning its energy reserves question Russia’s timing in the implementation of these 
decisions.243  For example, Russia increased the price of gas going to Georgia and 
Ukraine after popular elections defeated pro-Moscow candidates in those two countries.  
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Breakdown of subsequent negotiations between Ukraine and Russia over a fair market 
price of gas resulted in a temporary termination of the delivery of Russian gas to much of 
Western Europe in January 2006.244        
C.  SUMMARY 
This chapter has traced Soviet and Russian state strength from its apogee at the 
conclusion of World War II and documented its decline down the hierarchy culminating 
in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  After years of stagnation at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, the Russian Federation has begun to progress back up the hierarchy 
towards a strong state identity.  It has successfully established its internal and external 
legitimacy, quelled its internal political challengers and established relative domestic 
security.  Currently, Russia attempts to satisfy its third tier external security needs; 
however, it is here that Russia has begun to stagnate.   
The Russian-Georgian conflict did not have its intended effect.  Russia sought to 
intimidate Eastern European and Caucasian states into adopting pro-Russian policies, yet 
the opposite came true.  In fact, the conflict probably did more to exacerbate Russian 
external security needs than to satisfy them.  As evidence, a new spirit of cooperation 
exists among Baltic and Eastern European states, and Poland and the Czech Republic 
agreed to host U.S. missile defense components just days after the Russian invasion.  
Russia will not likely satisfy its external security needs until its competition with NATO 
ceases.     
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IV. CONCLUSION  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis set forth an ambitious goal by using a theory prominent in the 
behavioral sciences and applying that theory to the study of international relations.  In so 
doing, it sought to present an operational framework for ascertaining patterns in states’ 
foreign policy pursuits and extend those patterns into the future as forecasts of their 
possible behaviors.  This process is similar to a meteorologist observing indicators and 
making predictions on what the weather will be like at some point in the future.  While 
the meteorologist attempts to predict Mother Nature, intelligence analysts attempt to 
predict human nature.   
Overall, this thesis appears successful in developing a model explaining how the 
pursuit of legitimacy, internal security, external security, prestige, and strong state 
identity needs drive state behavior.  Additionally, this model remains relevant in an 
intelligence professional’s analysis of state behavior and the formulation of expected 
state courses of actions.  However, several weaknesses became apparent while applying 
the model to the Soviet/Russian case study.  These weaknesses necessitate some minor 
changes before using it operationally.    
B.  RECOMMENDED CHANGES  
First, the limiting assumption of a unitary rational actor may be too restrictive for 
using the model operationally.  The author made the decision to assume a unitary, 
rational actor to minimize the potential impact of logical fallacies on this thesis.  
However, this is an impractical assumption for intelligence professionals providing 
assessments to U.S. policy makers on real-world, dynamic situations.  While it was a 
useful assumption to analyze the Soviet/Russian case study from a historical perspective, 
it discounts the friction between different decision making layers in the formulation of 
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states’ foreign policies as outlined by Graham Allison.245  Often times, different 
bureaucratic layers within the process sit at different tiers on the hierarchy.  Different 
perspectives from sitting at different tiers on the hierarchy are often the source of friction 
between them.  President George W. Bush’s farewell address in January 2009 
demonstrates different perspectives that can develop between the constituent parts of a 
state and how those perspectives influence the state’s foreign policy.    
As the years passed, most Americans were able to return to life much as it 
had been before 9/11. But I never did. Every morning, I received a 
briefing on the threats to our nation, and I vowed to do everything in my 
power to keep us safe.246   
Presumably, President Bush viewed the U.S. on the third tier of the hierarchy 
attempting to satisfy its external security needs through his entire second term until the 
end of his presidency.  His statement above reflects the assessment of other politicians 
and a majority of the U.S. public as developing past external security needs and worrying 
more about U.S. prestige and its image abroad.  The friction between these two views 
affected the outcome of the 2008 presidential election.  Senator Barack Obama’s 
campaign statements reflected an optimism that the U.S. was progressing beyond third 
tier external security needs.  Consequently, he defeated Senator John McCain who a 
majority of the public viewed as closer to President Bush’s assessment of U.S. 
development.  On the surface, it appears that the election results will have an impact on 
U.S. foreign policy goals.  The same type of friction was visible in the Soviet/Russian 
case study. 
An example of this phenomenon in a Soviet/Russian context is the friction 
between Gorbachev and the hardliners over the retrenchment of Soviet commitments in 
Eastern Europe.  While Gorbachev felt very comfortable with this decision seeing it as a 
benefit to reestablishing Soviet prestige, the decision worried the Kremlin and military 
conservatives.  Intelligence analysts must understand these sources of friction as they 
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develop between different layers in the decision making process.  For example, U.S. 
policy makers could have offered assurances to appease conservatives’ fears and 
strengthen Gorbachev’s hand within his own government.  Different assessments of a 
state’s development among its constituent parts also provide certain opportunities for 
U.S. intelligence analysts and policy makers.   
Identifying friction between government and societal factions allows U.S. 
analysts and policy makers to target specific layers in the decision making process.  A 
good example of the opportunity friction presents to U.S. policy makers is the resolution 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.  On the surface and assuming a unitary rational 
actor, war appeared inevitable between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1962.  However, 
it became clear to President Kennedy that Premier Khrushchev was at odds with other 
factions within his government and did not seek an altercation with the U.S..  Kennedy 
ultimately developed a successful strategy that considered frictions within the Soviet 
government.  He remained resolute on the missile “quarantine” around Cuba, yet offered 
them a face saving measure of removing U.S. missiles from Turkey.  This strategy 
attempted to deter hawks in the Soviet government while attempting to strengthen 
Khrushchev’s hand.  The strategy ultimately proved successful at de-escalating the 
situation where an assumption of a unitary, rational actor may have led to war.  
Therefore, an assumption of a unitary, rational actor facilitates the explanation of the 
model, but it is not practical in applying the model to real-world situations.  One 
additional update is necessary as well. 
Secondly, it is important to emphasize the non-linear nature of needs within the 
hierarchy.  Maslow acknowledged that human beings pursue multiple needs 
simultaneously; however, he presented a linear model for the sake of offering a model of 
human behavior.  Though the thesis presented a linear format for simplicity’s sake, it is 
important to address the multiple needs states pursue in an operational environment.  In 
fact, an “economy of force” might apply where states pursue courses of action that satisfy 
as many needs as possible.  In this regard, Russian desire to participate in the SCO 
bolsters its prestige throughout Central Asia as a regional power, enhances its economic 
security through bilateral trade agreements with SCO members, and increases its 
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domestic security by coordinating regional anti-terrorism policies.  With these changes in 
mind, the thesis will apply them in a forecast of general trends expected in Russian policy 
during 2009.          
C. ANTICIPATED RUSSIAN BEHAVIORS IN 2009 
The goal of this thesis is to present a model capable of forecasting general trends 
in state behavior.  It seeks to provide a framework for categorizing state behavior as 
attempts to satisfy its legitimacy, domestic security, external security, prestige, and strong 
state identity needs.  Conversely, the model is not capable of predicting specific or 
tactical level behavior since human and societal interactions are too complex to predict 
these events consistently and accurately.  With this in mind, the thesis will make a few 
general characterizations about Russia’s current needs and offer examples of how Russia 
may pursue these needs in the future.     
Currently, a preponderance of Russian needs revolve around its external security 
interests while also pursuing policies to satisfy its prestige and domestic security needs as 
well.  Countering NATO expansion and advancing Russia’s interests in international 
energy markets are the two primary methods Russia uses to satisfy its external security 
needs at this time.  Additionally, Russia sees its counter NATO policies as an avenue to 
regain great power status and simultaneously address its prestige needs.  Prior to the 
Georgian invasion in 2008, these were the two primary sets of needs Russia addressed 
with most of its lower level needs sufficiently satisfied.  In fact, Russia continued to 
progress up the hierarchy with the pursuit of prestige becoming as important as its pursuit 
of external security.   
Recently, Russia began to regress after fallout from the Russian-Georgian 
conflict.  The conflict actually pushed Eastern European states closer to the West when 
they began to adopt policies quickly counter to Russian security interests.247  In some 
ways, Russia feels victimized by the West as being portrayed as the aggressor in the 
August conflict.  Conversely, Russia views itself as the defender of a helpless population 
                                                 
247 Poland and the Czech Republic signed NMD agreements with the U.S.. 
 93
                                                
of innocent people in the two breakaway Georgian provinces.248  Nevertheless, Russia 
has experienced some significant setbacks to its external security aims.  As a result, it 
now focuses primarily on external security and to a lesser degree on prestige.  
Additionally, the worldwide economic recession has had a significant impact on Russian 
economic security again exacerbating its external security needs.   
The economic instability produced by the recession is increasingly affecting 
Russian domestic security as well.  This marks a disparity between different segments of 
the Russian population.  The ruling elites still focus on external security and prestige 
needs while the average Russian worker increasingly focuses on economic issues.  As 
public discontent grows during the economic slowdown, internal groups within Russia 
may seize the opportunity to make political mischief within the country.  Communists 
and ultranationalists are already taking advantage of the growing discontent, and minority 
ethnic groups in the Federation could press for more autonomy at the same time should 
the Medvedev/Putin government weaken.  Though Russian officials have focused on 
external security and prestige needs over the last three years, they will increasingly have 
to address domestic security needs as well.249  Therefore, this thesis expects Russian 
behavior in 2009 oriented in large part to the satisfaction of its external security needs 
while addressing to a lesser extent its domestic security and prestige needs.   
Behavioral trends indicate Russia will seek greater competition with the West in 
the coming months while increasing its engagement with the East.  Increased competition 
with the West serves all three of its needs.  First, Russia believes that its policy of 
competition is proving successful and will ultimately result in NATO concessions in its 
eastward expansion thus addressing Russia’s external security needs.  Secondly, Western 
concessions would constitute a loss for NATO in Russia’s view and thus a win for itself 
in a zero-sum game environment.  Russia will view NATO concessions as enhancing its 
own prestige around the world and thus contributing to its goal of great power status.  
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Thirdly, competition with NATO enhances Russian domestic security.  Russian 
leadership could use its competition with NATO, especially the U.S., to fan Russian 
nationalism and divert the public’s attention away from domestic frustrations.  The 
following scenarios are only example behaviors Russia could adopt to satisfy its 
developmental needs.       
Russia’s drive to satisfy its external security needs through competition with 
NATO could develop in several ways.  First, Georgia’s future territorial integrity is in 
doubt with Russian “peacekeepers” occupying large parts of disputed Georgian territory.  
Russia continues to strengthen its military presence in Georgia with the possible 
establishment of Russian naval and airbases in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.250  In fact, integration of Russian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian 
societies is likely to continue over the next year to such an extent that sovereignty of the 
two breakaway regions will be indistinguishable from Russian sovereignty.  Russia could 
invoke its self-declared role as protector of the Caucasus should NATO begin to 
complain too loudly at the integration of the region.251  Russia could simply annex the 
breakaway regions should NATO states take any concrete measures to counter this 
integration.  Russian competition with NATO could spread to other areas of the Eastern 
Europe and the Near Abroad as well.   
Ukraine may become the focus of Russian foreign policy over the next year.  
Stopping or at least slowing Ukrainian foreign policy orientation towards the West is a 
critical external security goal for Russia.  Russia is not likely to use armed violence with 
Ukraine, as it did with Georgia, in the coming year; however, it will potentially apply 
coercive methods to influence the Ukrainian presidential election in January 2010.  
Facilitating the election of a Ukrainian president more amenable to Russia foreign policy 
goals helps to satisfy Russian external security needs, yet it is mindful that overt 
intimidation during the 2004 Ukrainian election backfired and resulted in the election of a 
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vehemently anti-Russian Ukrainian president.  The January 2009 row between Russia and 
Ukraine over European gas distribution has largely marginalized Ukrainian President 
Yushchenko and elevated the status of his political competitors.252  Russia wants to bring 
about Yushchenko’s defeat and the election of a pro-Russian politician, such as Viktor 
Yanukovych, to counter Western influence in Ukraine.  Yushchenko and his pro-Western 
government are especially vulnerable according to polls conducted in December 2008 
indicating a majority of Ukrainians oppose NATO membership and seek neutrality 
between the region’s powerful states.253   
Meanwhile, Russia feeling the pinch of the worldwide economic slowdown is 
likely to attempt further consolidation of its control over worldwide natural gas reserves.  
Such a move addresses its external security needs and potentially helps Russia satisfy its 
domestic security and prestige needs as well.  Russia has been very successful at 
consolidating its control over Eurasian gas reserves.  Moscow views further consolidation 
as an important goal in its foreign policy pursuits for Russia uses gas less as a business 
commodity and more as strategic leverage.  Russia has gained a great deal of control over 
Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas; however, Azerbaijan is one state that stands well 
outside Moscow’s energy sphere of influence. 
Over the next year, Russia may focus on bringing Azerbaijan back into its sphere 
of influence.  The Kremlin would like to sever Azerbaijan’s good relationship with the 
West and gain greater control over Azerbaijani gas.  Russia could try and ingratiate its 
way into the hearts of Azeri leaders by mediating talks with Armenia over the Nagorno-
Karabakh, but it will conceivably use more coercive methods should Azerbaijan rebuff 
Russian overtures.  Obstructing the Nabucco pipeline and promoting its own South and 
Nord stream pipelines would help Russia gain greater control of Central Asian natural 
gas.  Additionally, other economic goals could help Russia satisfy its external security 
goals. 
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Russia has interest in undermining the U.S.’s position as the dominant global 
economic power.  One way to accomplish this is for Russia to promote other currencies at 
the expense of the dollar in international transactions.  Again, Russia views a loss in U.S. 
prestige as a gain for Russia.  This behavior could potentially help provide a convenient 
scapegoat for Kremlin leaders and deflect domestic criticism away from Russia’s poor 
economic performance.  The economic recession highlights the possibility of Russian 
developmental regression down the hierarchy in the coming months where the ruling elite 
may have to exert more effort in satisfying Russia’s second tier domestic security needs. 
The Medvedev/Putin government is coming under fire for their handling of the 
Russian economy.  Mass protests over deteriorating economic conditions could further 
invigorate Russian communists and nationalists.  Additionally, economic uncertainty and 
social unrest potentially reopens old ethnic wounds as Russians compete for a smaller 
pool of state resources.  As a result, Medvedev and Putin may face the need to crackdown 
on the domestic unrest; consequently, edging further away from democratic norms.  
Domestic instability could grow and cause Russian regression to the point where 
domestic security needs become prepotent over external security needs.  The possibility 
of these developments presents substantial challenges to the Obama Administration over 
the coming year.  
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
President Obama and his administration must always remember two concerns 
regarding Russia.  First, Russia sees the world as a zero-sum game.  Russia will not 
interpret concessions made by the West as anything but the West’s loss and Russia’s 
gain, and Russians have not historically looked for win-win opportunities when 
formulating foreign policy.  Secondly, Russia is very sensitive regarding respect and the 
loss of face in international relations.  One of Russia’s biggest complaints since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union has been the West’s treatment of Russia as a second rate 
power.  As a result, Russians demand that the West give them the respect they feel they 
deserve.  The following statements from former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and 
former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov underscore this point. 
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Americans have a severe disease - worse than AIDS.  It's called the 
winner's complex (Gorbachev).  The practice of inter-state relations where 
Russia incurred substantial economic losses as quid pro quo for gaining 
the friendliness of the leaders of certain foreign countries is a thing of the 
past (Ivanov).254 
Given that Russian needs focus largely on its external security and to a lesser 
extent on its domestic security and prestige needs, the Obama Administration can do 
several things to help Russia satisfy its needs in a more positive manner.  This thesis 
advocates taking a dual track with regards to U.S.-Russian relations.  In much the same 
way, President Kennedy crafted a policy focused at different levels of the Soviet decision 
making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the proposed dual track offered by this 
thesis seeks to deter some elements of the Russian government while encouraging 
engagement with more moderate Russian leaders.  In fact, there is increasing evidence 
that declining economic security in the country is exacerbating a rift between a reportedly 
more moderate President Medvedev and more authoritarian Prime Minister Putin.255  The 
following recommendations seek to consider this development and the multiple 
perspectives within the Russian decision making progress.  
One must remember that a threat to the U.S. is any state which has the intent and 
capability to do harm.  First, U.S. officials should reengage with Russia in an attempt to 
improve relations, listen to their concerns, and find ways to work together on issues of 
mutual interest.  The aim is to disincentivize Russian intent to do the U.S. harm.  
Secondly, the administration should take concrete steps towards thwarting Russia’s 
capability to do the U.S. harm, namely, prevent Russia from seizing controlling interests 
of the world’s natural gas supply and using energy as strategic leverage used to finance a 
counter NATO policy while blackmailing its neighbors into compliance with its foreign 
policy designs.  How would such a policy look?   
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U.S. officials must be willing to sit down and listen to Russia while attempting to 
reengage with it on issues of mutual interest as well as on issues of dispute.  U.S. officials 
should have no allusions, however, to how Russia will perceive this move.  Russia will 
likely see this as affirmation of a successful policy of competition and will seek ways to 
press their advantage.  However, this policy in the end could give more credibility to 
President Medvedev as the deliverer of something Prime Minister Putin could not.  It 
could act as a catalyst for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation should a rift between Putin 
and Medvedev truly exist.  Ultimately, the administration should try to help Russia 
satisfy its needs in a more constructive manner.  Several ideas come to mind to achieve 
this goal.    
First, the Obama Administration should change the focus of Western expansion 
into Russia’s Near Abroad.  The closer NATO comes to Russian borders, the more it 
pushes against NATO.  President Obama should instead encourage European Union (EU) 
enlargement vice rapid NATO expansion.  Prime Minister Putin is on record as 
advocating a “common economic space” in Europe.256  While still the Russian President, 
Putin envisioned states of the former Soviet Union gaining membership in the EU, 
including Ukraine, and spoke of EU enlargement as a positive factor that would “help 
strengthen the system of international relations.”257  Encouraging EU enlargement firmly 
anchors Eastern European and possibly Caucasian states in the West, but it does not 
exacerbate Russian sensitivities over stationing NATO military units in former Soviet 
states.  EU enlargement also gives prospective NATO members the opportunity to slowly 
transition their militaries over to Western standards.  NATO should not abandon its 
eastward expansion, but it should slow the process down.  Essentially, EU enlargement 
vice NATO expansion could be a confidence building measure between Russia and the 
West.   
Secondly, the Administration should try to reengage Russia in areas of mutual 
interest.  Issues such as terrorism, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, reduction of 
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ian relations.   
                                                
nuclear weapons stockpiles, and combating proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear states are as important to the West as they are to Russia.  Additionally, the 
administration should reengage Russia in regards to NMD.   
Russia does not, on the surface, object to the creation of a U.S. missile defense 
shield.  In fact, Putin proposed the idea to the Clinton Administration in 2000.258   
Russia, however, does object to the placement of U.S. military assets in former Eastern 
Bloc countries.  Russia equates its sensitivities over such a development to U.S. 
sensitivities regarding Soviet missiles in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.259  Putin 
understands the U.S. desire to create a missile defense shield and indicated Russian 
acquiescence with its placement in “southern countries” such as Turkey or other NATO 
states.260  With this in mind, the Obama Administration should consider reviewing the 
deployment of NMD assets to installations in Eastern Europe.  The administration could 
use this change in policy as a quid pro quo for Russian help in stopping the proliferation 
of nuclear and missile technology to Iran.  NMD deployment to southern European 
countries could also provide the U.S. some tactical advantage from a closer proximity to 
threatening states, but it exposes the system to greater risk at the same time.  Nonetheless, 
a review of the deployment would go a long way to improving U.S.-Russ
Russia has also played a game of tit for tat with the U.S. over the last several 
years.  Russia’s desire to create a sphere of influence in South America as a response to 
U.S. interest in the Near Abroad is evidence of this assertion.  Though Russia would have 
to overcome substantial Cuban apprehension, Russia could seek to deploy missiles of its 




258 Lorna Thomas, “U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Tensions and Russian Military Resurgence,” Global 
Politician, http://www.globalpolitician.com/24770-russia-military (accessed February 9, 2009). 
259 Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008). 
260 Ibid. 
 100
                                                
U.S. missiles in Eastern Europe.261  Conversely, the Obama Administration should take 
concrete steps to minimize Russia’s capability should a policy of reengagement not 
achieve the intended results.   
Russia has a mixed capability to do harm to U.S. interests.  On the one hand, it 
has a substantial nuclear capability.  It possesses thousands of nuclear armaments and has 
the capability to deliver them across the globe.  Moreover, it is still one of the few states 
on earth with the technological capability to project conventional land, air, and naval 
forces well beyond its borders and sell that technology to other nefarious states.  On the 
other hand, Russian power projection rests on the foundation of a crumbling 
infrastructure and declining demographic trends.  In fact, the Russian population could 
decline to under one-hundred million people by the middle of the century presenting 
severe problems in fielding a permanent military capable of defending its territorial 
boundaries.262  Nonetheless, Russia has access to large energy reserves, which give it the 
capability to counter U.S. interests.      
Considering Russia’s use of its energy reserves as a method of financing its 
counter-NATO policies, the Obama Administration should strive to reduce the 
effectiveness of this weapon.  First, the administration should maintain strong diplomatic 
and security ties with Azerbaijan as Russia attempts to gain greater control over Central 
Asian gas distribution.  The government of Azerbaijan has been very deft in its tightrope 
walk between the region’s powers.  Despite this agility, the Obama Administration must 
maintain strong relations with Azerbaijan and render support to them should they need it. 
Secondly, the administration should support European trade unity in the 
negotiation of energy deals.  Russia has successfully undermined EU trade authority 
preferring to negotiate bilateral agreements with individual EU states.  Russia has 
increased its control over production and distribution of Eurasian energy reserves in these  
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deals and has increased European dependency on Russian supplied energy at the same 
time.  The U.S. should support Eastern European calls to negotiate energy agreements 
with Russia as a unified trade block without defections of individual EU member states.  
Finally, the Administration should make alternative and diversified sources of 
energy a national security priority for the U.S..  The U.S. Department of Energy expects 
international consumption of natural gas to increase steadily through 2030.263  Natural 
gas produces less carbon dioxide than other sources of fossil fuels making it a favored 
source of energy as advanced industrial states try to limit carbon emissions and address 
climate change.  In 2008, the U.S. was the largest consumer of natural gas and accounted 
for approximately twenty percent of international consumption or nearly 653 billion 
cubic meters of 3.2 trillion cubic meters of world demand.264  Currently, domestic and 
Canadian gas suppliers meet most U.S. demand; however, Russia is interested in entering 
the lucrative U.S. market and supplying up to twenty percent of U.S. demand in the next 
decade.265  Decreasing U.S. demand for natural gas makes it less dependent on foreign 
sources of energy and less susceptible to energy blackmail.  Additionally, a decrease in 
U.S. demand decreases pressure on worldwide supply and expectedly drives international 
gas prices down minimizing a good source of Russian revenue for its anti-NATO 
policies.  Yet, none of these measures constitutes a silver bullet for solving friction in 
U.S.-Russian relations.   
In light of Russia’s expected behaviors, the Obama Administration should expect 
a road of challenges ahead.  U.S.-Russian relations did not deteriorate overnight, nor will 
they improve overnight.  Administration officials will increasingly rely on intelligence 
analysts to evaluate Russia’s current behavior for discernable trends.  They will expect  
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analytical assessments extending those trends into the future to determine what behaviors 
Russia could adopt.  The author hopes that this thesis provides analysts and decision 
makers a tool to make the job a little easier.   
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